The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law

Catholic Law Scholarship Repository
Scholarly Articles

Faculty Scholarship

2015

Patent Boundaries
Elizabeth I. Winston
The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/scholar
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Elizabeth I. Winston, Patent Boundaries, 87 TEMPLE L. REV 501 (2015).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Catholic Law Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Articles by an authorized administrator of Catholic Law
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu.

PATENT BOUNDARIES
Elizabeth I. Winston *
A patent grants a limited right to exclude others from practicing an invention
within the United States, its territories and possessions. Much has been written
about the limits of the patent grant and how to determine what the protected
invention may be. At the same time, scholars have not systemically analyzed the
geographic limitations of United States patents, a critical component of a
patentee’s limited right. A patent’s geographical scope is not simple to discern.
Commentators have neither analyzed the patent boundaries collectively nor
delineated the scope of patent sovereignty on land, in the air, and at sea.
Technology has spread to every corner of the earth, bringing once hostile territory
under the spell of deepwater oil drilling and satellite communication systems,
within the reach of mobile phone technology, and beyond the scope of our current
understanding of patent law. United States patents are only enforceable within the
United States, which now extends from the International Space Station to the
Outer Continental Shelf. As the limits of technology and geography increase, the
delineation of the patent boundaries of the United States becomes increasingly
important.
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INTRODUCTION

Patent law is territorial. 1 Technology is not. Innovation is occurring at the
outer boundaries of the world, through scientific research on the International
Space Station, deep underwater drilling on the continental shelf, and mobile data
servers on the high seas. “Patent boundaries” has been used to refer to the scope
of a patent’s claims and the meaning of claim terms. 2 However, there is another
type of patent boundary that has been virtually ignored to date, but is becoming
increasingly important with the expansion of technology. The territorial
limitations on the rights granted by a patent allow patent law to extend to the
United States, its territories and possessions, and no farther, while technology is
increasingly finding its way to parts of the world where the claim to United
States patent law is at best tenuous. 3 This Article is the first to systemically
analyze law, policy, and historical precedent to define the territorial reach of
United States patent law.
Consider the case of GlobalSantaFe’s GSF Development Driller I, a mobile
offshore drilling unit based in the Gulf of Mexico within the United States
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). 4 GSF Development Driller I was built in
Singapore, initially leased by a Cayman Islands company, and operated by a
Swiss company under a Panamanian flag. This multicultural drilling unit raises
many questions of sovereignty, not the least of which is whether the EEZ is
within the United States, and, therefore, whether the GSF Development Driller I
is subject to United States patent law when in the Gulf of Mexico. Can an
injunction against the use of the GSF Development Driller I prevent its use in the
Gulf of Mexico? 5 The GSF Development Driller I case typifies a growing
question in patent litigation: namely, what protection exists when the

1. The United States patent laws “do not, and were not intended to, operate beyond the limits
of the United States.” Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 195 (1856). “It is the general rule
under United States patent law that no infringement occurs when a patented product is made and sold
in another country.” Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 441 (2007).
2. See, e.g., Tun-Jen Chiang, Fixing Patent Boundaries, 108 MICH. L. REV. 523 (2010).
3. International treaties recognize the territorial limitations to patent law, without delineating
those distinctions. Article 4bis(1) of the Paris Convention states, “Patents applied for in the various
countries of the Union by nationals of countries of the Union shall be independent of patents obtained
for the same invention in other countries, whether members of the Union or not.” Paris Convention
for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 4bis, Mar. 20, 1883, 24 U.S.T. 2140, 828 U.N.T.S. 305.
The preamble to the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights states that its members recognize “the underlying public policy objectives
of national systems for the protection of intellectual property.” Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1197, 1869 U.N.T.S.
299. Neither of these treaties defines the countries or national systems, but both recognize the
territoriality of patent law.
4. GSF Development Driller I Drilling Rig, SUBSEA OIL & GAS DIRECTORY,
http://www.subsea.org/drilling-rigs/rigspec.asp?rigID=231 (last visited May 15, 2015); Neptune Field,
United States of America, OFFSHORE TECHNOLOGY.COM, http://www.offshore-technology.com/projects
/neptune-field/ (last visited May 15, 2015).
5. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. GlobalSantaFe Corp., No. H–03–2910, 2006
WL 3813778, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006).
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globalization of technology has not kept pace with the patent regulation of the
same? 6
In order to understand United States patent law and its territorial limits, the
first question to be asked is: What is the United States? Patent infringement
must occur within the United States, and yet the term is vague and ambiguous. 7
The Patent Act of 1952 set forth for the first time a definition of the “United
States” with respect to patent law, stating simply that “the terms ‘United States’
and ‘this country’ mean the United States of America, its territories and
possessions.” 8 This cursory and circular definition provides little guidance as to
the geographic limits on patent rights, and the notes in the legislative history are
of no further help, evidencing only that the definition was “added to avoid the
use of long expressions in various parts of the revised title.” 9 There is no further
legislative history, 10 but a later essay written by one of the primary forces behind
the Patent Act of 1952, P.J. Federico, states:
The phrase “and the Territories thereof” which followed “United
States” in the old statute has been omitted in the new section since
“United States” is defined in section 100(c) as meaning “the United
States of America, its territories and possessions.” It should be noted
that the territorial scope of the patent is now more broadly and more
definitely stated. 11
Other bodies of law set forth a variety of definitions of the United States. 12
The Tariff Act of 1930, which is still used to exclude the importation of infringing
6. The sale of an oil rig was held subject to United States patent law by the Federal Circuit
recently because “an offer which is made in Norway by a U.S. company to a U.S. company to sell a
product within the U.S., for delivery and use within the U.S. constitutes an offer to sell within the
U.S.” Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617 F.3d 1296,
1309 (Fed. Cir. 2010). No analysis of the location of the use, which was the Gulf of Mexico, was made.
7. Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 671–72 (1945), overruled by Limbach v. Hooven
& Allison Co., 466 U.S. 353 (1984) (“The term ‘United States’ may be used in any one of several
senses. It may be merely the name of a sovereign occupying the position analogous to that of other
sovereigns in the family of nations. It may designate the territory over which the sovereignty of the
United States extends, or it may be the collective name of the states which are united by and under the
Constitution.”).
8. Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, ch. 950, § 100, 66 Stat. 797 (codified at 35 U.S.C.
§ 100(c) (2012)).
9. Id.
10. Proposed amendments to the Patent Act did not specifically define United States, but instead
in defining patent infringement stated that a patent could be infringed by “[a]ny person who makes,
uses or sells any patented machine, manufacture, composition of matter or improvement, or uses any
patented process or improvement, within the territory of the United States and its Territories . . .
infringes the patent.” STAFF OF THE H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 81ST CONG., PROPOSED REVISION
AND AMENDMENT OF THE PATENT LAWS 59 (Comm. Print 1950).
11. P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, reprinted in 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC’Y 161, 201 (1993).
12. U.S. Lines Co. v. Eastburn Marine Chem. Co., Inc., 221 F. Supp. 881, 883–84 (S.D.N.Y.
1963) (“Normally the word ‘territories’ is used as including only the portions of the United States
territorial possessions which are organized and exercising governmental functions under act of
Congress. But the use of the word ‘territories’ depends on the character and aim of the act. The
Panama Canal Zone is not always included as ‘Territory of the United States.’ A beacon owned by the
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devices into the United States, defines the “United States” as including “all
Territories and possessions of the United States except the Virgin Islands,
American Samoa, Wake Island, Midway Islands, Kingman Reef, Johnston
Island, and the island of Guam.” 13 The Homeland Security Act of 2002 defines
the term “United States,” when used in the “geographic sense,” as “any State of
the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands, any possession of the United States, and any waters within the
jurisdiction of the United States.” 14 Yet another definition can be found in the
Immigration and Nationality Act and its geographic definition of the “United
States” as including “the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico,
Guam, the Virgin Islands of the United States, and the Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands.” 15 What is included in the United States for
immigration purposes is excluded for purposes of the Tariff Act of 1930, while
the Patent Act of 1952 appears to have the broadest definition of all.
This Article is the first to show the sheer indeterminacy of the legal
constraints that currently apply to patent activities and the fatal flaws in the
ambiguity inherent in defining the United States patent boundaries only as “the
United States of America, its territories and possessions.” 16 Section II of the
Article questions the use of technology at sea and examines the impact of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on patent infringement claims
made under the United States Patent Code. Arguing that international custom
should delineate the United States patent boundaries, the Article applies early
case law to delineate the seaward patent boundaries of the United States. Next,
the Article evaluates the patent boundaries of outer space and the impact the
boundaries have on commercial space technology. Applying the pertinent
provisions of the Outer Space Treaty to the patent boundaries of the United
States, the limits of United States patent law in airspace and outer space are
examined in Section III of this Article. Finally, sovereignty rights relating to
United States lands are detailed in Section IV of this Article.
Technology is eroding traditional national borders. Offshore drilling is a
rich source of energy and innovation. Exoplanets and other celestial bodies are
in the news as commercialization of outer space approaches reality and space
tourism exists. Cloud computing renders the distance between the data and the
user less important than the speed with which the user can access that data. Each

United States is not one of its ‘possessions’ within the meaning of the phrase ‘from the coast of the
United States, the coast of its territories, or the coast of its possessions’ as used in a treaty between the
United States and Great Britain. Areas in Bermuda leased to the United States by the British
Government for 99 years are neither territories nor possessions of the United States within the
meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Residence in the Philippine Islands was held not to be
residence ‘within the United States’ for naturalization purposes.”) (internal citations omitted).
13. 19 U.S.C. § 1401(h) (2012).
14. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–296, § 2, 116 Stat. 2140 (codified as
amended at 6 U.S.C. § 101(17)(A) (2012)).
15. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(38) (2012).
16. 35 U.S.C. § 100(c) (2012).
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of these issues demands an answer to the question of how far the United States
patent boundaries extend.
II.

AT SEA

Technology, law, demand for energy, and geology have pushed innovation
farther from the land-based geographic boundaries of the United States, literally
sending technology out to sea. Litigation has been brought alleging patent
infringement on the Outer Continental Shelf, in the EEZ, and on board ships
sailing the high seas. Does drilling on the Outer Continental Shelf occur within
the patent boundaries of the United States? 17 Where is a patent on a shipborne
computing center enforceable? 18
What sovereignty does the United States exercise over the seas adjacent to
the United States, and over the land beneath those seas? How far does this
sovereignty extend? In order to practice technology without infringing a patent,
knowledge of geography and technology is required. Knowing the metes and
bounds of the patent allows innovation by encouraging competitors to design
around the protected technology. Knowing the metes and bounds of the United
States allows competitors to know what laws apply to the use of technology
where the use occurs. If a patent does not clearly claim what is covered by the
patent, then the patent is unenforceable. Similarly, a delineation of the nautical
United States patent boundaries would allow competitors to know where a
patent is unenforceable.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS” or
“Law of the Sea”) sets forth much of the world’s understanding of the
boundaries of sovereignty by nations over their adjacent seas. The United States
is a signatory to UNCLOS, but Congress has never ratified the treaty, and so
within the United States the treaty remains advisory in nature. 19 The Law of the
Sea addresses maritime boundaries, and delineates each member state’s rights
with respect to its adjacent seas, setting forth a number of maritime zones. Under
the Law of the Sea, the first twelve nautical miles off the coast of a member state

17. The Outer Continental Shelf is an area rich in oil, natural gas, and other resources, a site for
many offshore drilling platforms, and an area booming in innovation. See, e.g., OCS Lands Act
History, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT, http://www.boem.gov/Oil-and-Gas-EnergyProgram/Leasing/Outer-Continental-Shelf/Lands-Act-History/OCSLA-HIstory.aspx (last visited May
15, 2015) (stating that “24 percent of [the nation’s] domestic oil production and 7 percent of its
domestic natural gas production” come from “OCS oil and gas exploration and development”).
18. Google has patented a “Water-Based Data Center,” claiming shipborne computing centers
using wave motion as a source of power. These mobile computing centers will be able to move
anywhere in the world, bringing data and computing to regions traditionally isolated from the modern
computer age. Water-Based Data Center, U.S. Patent No. 7,525,207 (filed Feb. 26, 2007).
19. One hundred fifty-seven other countries are signatories to the treaty. Chapter XXI Law of
the Sea, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTIONS
(Mar. 5, 2015, 5:01 PM), https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=
XXI-6&chapter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en#1; see also United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
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is known as that state’s “territorial sea.” 20 Each state has complete sovereignty
over its inland waters and territorial sea. 21 The zone contiguous to the territorial
sea, extending no farther than twenty-four miles off the coast of a member state,
is known as the “contiguous zone.” 22 In each state’s contiguous zone, member
states have restricted sovereignty. 23 The next zone, which can extend no more
than 200 nautical miles from a country’s baseline, is known as the EEZ. 24 Within
its own EEZ, a member state has limited sovereignty. 25 All remaining maritime
area is designated as the “high seas”—territory over which no one member state
can exercise sovereignty. 26 In addition to these maritime rights, each member
state has rights to the seabed beneath its adjacent waters—specifically to the
continental shelf, which “comprises the sea-bed and subsoil of the submarine
areas.” 27 The patent sovereignty of the United States over each maritime zone
and the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) is discussed in detail below.
A.

Territorial Seas

In 1988, President Reagan signed into law a presidential proclamation
defining the territorial sea of the United States of America as the waters
adjacent to the United States extending “12 nautical miles from the baselines of
the United States.” 28 These territorial waters extend to the waters surrounding
the “United States of America, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam,
American Samoa, the United States Virgin Islands, the Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands, and any other territory or possession over which the
United States exercises sovereignty.” 29 The United States “exercises sovereignty
and jurisdiction . . . [over] the airspace over the territorial sea, as well as to its
bed and subsoil.” 30 Within twelve nautical miles of the coastline of the United
States and its territories and possessions, the law is the same as it would be
within the physical land boundaries of the United States. 31 Per the United States
sovereignty over its territorial seas, the Patent Act is enforceable within these
boundaries, and United States law governs any patent infringement that occurs
within the United States territorial seas, whether the patented invention is
practiced in the water, on the seabed beneath that water, or in the air

20. Id. art. 3.
21. Id. art. 2.
22. Id. art. 33.
23. Id.
24. Id. art. 57.
25. Id. art. 56.
26. Id. arts. 86–87.
27. Id. art. 76.
28. Proclamation No. 5928, 54 Fed. Reg. 777 (Dec. 27, 1988).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See WesternGeco L.L.C. v. Ion Geographical Corp. (WesternGeco I), 776 F. Supp. 2d 342,
365 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (“[T]he United States possesses complete sovereignty over the territorial sea—a
belt of sea that extends no more than 12 miles seaward of the baseline of the coastal state.”).
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overhead. 32 This should be codified within the Patent Code, and the definition of
the United States should be further clarified, as the United Kingdom has done. 33
The territorial seas are within the United States patent boundaries.
B.

Contiguous Zone

Extending twelve miles outward from the territorial seas of the United
States is the contiguous zone. Presidential Proclamation 7219 established the
contiguous zone of the United States in 1999. 34 The United States recognizes a
contiguous zone that extends twenty-four nautical miles from the United States’
coast, excluding any other nation’s territorial seas that may otherwise fall within
the contiguous zone of the United States. 35 The contiguous zone acts as a buffer
between a country’s territorial seas, where the country is sovereign, and the high
seas, where no country is sovereign.
Within the contiguous zone the United States may regulate issues relating
to “customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary laws and regulations.” 36 These
regulations, as they apply to the waters and the maritime rights, are mainly
policy oriented in nature, with the goal of protecting the United States territorial
sea, and the understanding that maritime environments move and change.
Within the contiguous zone
the ships and aircraft of all countries enjoy the high seas freedoms of
navigation and overflight and the laying of submarine cables and
pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to
those freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of ships,
aircraft, and submarine cables and pipelines. 37
Patent law is not an issue related to “customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary
laws and regulations,” 38 nor is it a policy question with a direct impact on the

32. At least one terms and services agreement attempts to expressly codify the territorial seas as
part of the United States, stating:
Notwithstanding delivery, title to Products shipped from the U.S. to a destination outside the
U.S. shall pass to Buyer immediately after each item departs from the territorial land, seas
and overlying airspace of the U.S. The Parties acknowledge and agree that the territorial
seas of the U.S. extend to twelve nautical miles from the baseline of the country determined
in accordance with the 1982 United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea.
GENERAL ELECTRIC, STANDARD TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF SALE § 6.2 (2010), available at
https://customer.getransportation.com/public/signaling/GS_Sales_Terms.pdf.
33. In the United Kingdom, patent sovereignty over the territorial seas has been expressly
codified, but not so in the United States. The Patents Act 1977, c. 37, § 132(3) (U.K.).
34. Proclamation No. 7219, 64 Fed. Reg. 48,701 (Aug. 2, 1999).
35. Id.
36. Id.; see also UNCLOS, supra note 19, art. 33 (stating that a coastal state may “prevent
infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations,” and punish
infringement of those laws, in its contiguous zone); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 511(b) cmt. a, k (1987) (stating that coastal states have “limited
policing rights in the contiguous zone” and may “enforce specified laws” in their respective contiguous
zones).
37. Proclamation No. 7219, 64 Fed. Reg. 48,701 (Aug. 2, 1999).
38. Id.
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territorial seas, or a freedom of the high sea, excluded from a country’s
regulations. The contiguous zone lies outside the United States patent
boundaries.
C.

Exclusive Economic Zone

Beyond the territorial sea lies not only the contiguous zone, but also the
United States EEZ. The EEZ is defined by the Law of the Sea as “an area
beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea” which “shall not extend beyond
200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial
sea is measured.” 39 The United States EEZ was established by Presidential
Proclamation 5030 in 1983, and includes the contiguous zone discussed above,
and all other waters adjacent to the United States territorial seas extending 200
nautical miles from the territorial seas. 40
In the EEZ, the United States “possesses sovereign rights in economic
exploitation of natural resources and jurisdiction over marine scientific
research.” 41 These rights include:
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring, exploiting, conserving
and managing natural resources, both living and non-living, of the
seabed and subsoil and the superjacent waters and with regard to other
activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone,
such as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds;
and (b) jurisdiction with regard to the establishment and use of
artificial islands, and installations and structures having economic
purposes, and the protection and preservation of the marine
environment. 42
Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. (Transocean), an AngloAustralian company, holds several United States patents for methods and
apparatus for offshore drilling. In 2006, Transocean received a permanent
injunction prohibiting the use of the GSF Development Driller I “in the United
States for the term of the Transocean patents.” 43 Does Transocean’s injunction
cover the EEZ—in other words, if the oil rig is used within the EEZ, is it used
within the United States?

39. UNCLOS, supra note 19, arts. 55, 57.
40. Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,605 (Mar. 10, 1983).
41. WesternGeco I, 776 F. Supp. 2d 342, 366 (S.D. Tex. 2011); see also 16 U.S.C. § 1811 (2012)
(stating that the United States claims “sovereign rights” over all fish and “Continental fishery
resources” within the EEZ); UNCLOS, supra note 19, art. 56 (stating that coastal states have
“sovereign rights” as to natural resources within their EEZ); Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg.
10,605 (Mar. 10, 1983) (stating that the United States has “sovereign rights” relating to natural
resources within the EEZ); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S.
§ 511(d) cmt. a (1987) (stating that coastal states exercise sovereign rights “over economic
exploitation” of the EEZ).
42. Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,605 (Mar. 10, 1983).
43. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. GlobalSantaFe Corp., No. H–03–2910,
2006 WL 3813778, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006).
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The EEZ must be a territory or a possession of the United States in order to
come within the patent boundaries set by 35 U.S.C. § 100(c). Presidential
Proclamation 5030 limits the United States’ sovereignty over the EEZ, explicitly
stating that the EEZ “remains an area beyond the territory and territorial sea of
the United States in which all States enjoy the high seas freedoms of navigation,
overflight, the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other
internationally lawful uses of the sea.” 44 The rights of a nation over its EEZ are
far more limited than the rights of a nation over its territorial seas, and the
Presidential Proclamation recognizes this. 45
In this day and age of an increased focus on offshore drilling, the issue of
patent infringement in the EEZ is becoming increasingly important, both
domestically and internationally. 46 The governments of Australia and the United
Kingdom, and the judicial systems of the United Kingdom, South Africa, and the
United States, have addressed patent infringement in the EEZ but have not
provided a uniform determination as to whether the EEZ constitutes part of a
country’s territory for purposes of that country’s patent code.
The Australian Patent Code states that it “extends to: (a) each external
Territory; and (b) the Australian continental shelf; and (c) the waters above the
Australian continental shelf; and (d) the airspace above Australia, each external
Territory and the Australian continental shelf.” 47 “Australia” is defined as
including “each external Territory” while the “Australian continental shelf” is
defined as “the continental shelf adjacent to the coast of Australia (including the
coast of any island forming part of a State or Territory).” 48 If the EEZ was an
external territory, and therefore automatically part of Australia, then the
language extending the Patent Code to the external territories would cover the
EEZ as well. 49 Under a strict construction of the Australian Patent Code, the
EEZ is excluded from the definition of Australia.
In 2003, a patent infringement suit was brought alleging infringement off
the coast of the United Kingdom, in the United Kingdom EEZ. 50 Patent

44. Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,605 (Mar. 10, 1983).
45. In fact, some countries explicitly argue that their territorial seas extend throughout the
EEZ, seeking to expand their national sovereignty. The United Nations maintains a chart indicating
some of the inconsistencies between national claims of sovereignty and the Law of the Sea for
informational purposes only. U.N. DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, TABLE
OF CLAIMS TO MARITIME JURISDICTION (2011), available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/
LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/table_summary_of_claims.pdf.
46. See, e.g., Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Drilling USA, Inc., 699
F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (involving a patent infringement lawsuit over an offshore drilling
apparatus).
47. Patents Act 1990 s 12 (Austl.).
48. Id. sch I (Austl.).
49. WesternGeco I, 776 F. Supp. 2d 342, 368–69 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (observing that “Australia has
made a separate provision for the application of its patent law to the EEZ because the EEZ is not its
territory”).
50. Specifically, the alleged infringing activity occurred in “the Leadon field in water depths of
about 120m, and the other in the East Foinaven field in water depths of about 300-500m.” Rockwater
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infringement in the United Kingdom, like in the United States, must occur
within the territorial boundaries of the United Kingdom. 51 The patents at issue
covered a pipe-laying ship, and the alleged infringement was that of a
competitor’s pipe-laying ship deployed in the United Kingdom EEZ to lay
pipes. 52 The first paragraph of the opinion states that the “jurisdiction under
s.132(4) of the Patents Act 1977 is not in dispute.” 53 The Patents Act 1977
applies
to acts done in an area designated by order under section 1(7) of the
Continental Shelf Act 1964, or specified by Order under section 10(8)
of the Petroleum Act 1998 in connection with any activity falling within
section 11(2) of that Act, as it applies to acts done in the United
Kingdom. 54
In addition, the United Kingdom has the power to designate areas as being
covered by the Patents Act 1977. Numerous designations have subsequently
been made, and sections of the EEZ and the continental shelf have been
designated as coming within the purview of the Patents Act 1977. 55 This case
does not render a determination as to whether the entire EEZ falls within the
coverage of the Patents Act 1977, but under certain circumstances, patent
infringement can be found in the EEZ of the United Kingdom. 56
In South Africa, one judicial opinion specifically found that South Africa
has at least limited patent sovereignty over the South Africa EEZ. 57 In that case,
the patent at issue covered “an apparatus for transferring fluid – particularly oil
produced by a sub-sea deposit – between the sea and the sea surface.” 58 The

Ltd. v. Coflexip S.A., [2003] EWHC (Ch) 812, [1], (Eng.). Each of these fields is in the United
Kingdom EEZ.
51. G. Matthew McCloskey, Hiroshi Sheraton & Ashley Tarokh, The Extent of Patent Coverage
in Offshore Waters: A Comparison, MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY INT’L NEWS, Issue 1 2012, at 8,
available at http://documents.lexology.com/e3e0c58a-fd12-42d2-a01e-79392450a14a.pdf.
52. Rockwater Ltd., [2003] EWHC (Ch) at 812[1].
53. The parties in this litigation did not contest that the United Kingdom patent boundaries
extended to the EEZ. There was no discussion as to whether the alleged infringing activity took place
on the OCS or in the fishing waters designated for coverage under the Patents Act 1977. Id.
54. The Patents Act 1977, c. 37, § 132(4) (U.K.).
55. See McCloskey et al., supra note 51 (“Section 132(2–3) provides that the Patents Act applies
to the Isle of Man and to the territorial waters of the United Kingdom respectively. Section 132(4)
provides for two further extra-territorial extensions. The first is to any areas designated under Section
1(7) of the Continental Shelf Act 1964. Numerous designations have been made since 1964, primarily
to encompass various oil fields and fishing grounds in close proximity to UK waters. By these
designations, all provisions relating to patents apply to the extended areas. The second extension
relates to areas specified under Section 10(8) of the Petroleum Act 1998. In those areas, the Patents
Act applies only in connection with the exploration of the sea bed or of subsoil, or exploitation of their
natural resources, although this is extended to installations concerned with exploration, exploitation,
transport by pipes and provision of accommodation.”).
56. Rockwater Ltd., [2003] EWHC (Ch) at 812[1].
57. Schlumberger Logelco Inc v. Coflexip S A 2000 (3) SA 861 (SCA) at para. 1 (S. Afr.).
58. Id. at para. 2.
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infringer installed such an apparatus in the South Africa EEZ. 59 The infringer
argued that no infringement under South African patent law could be found
within the South Africa EEZ. 60 The Patent Code of South Africa grants rights to
the patentee “in the Republic,” a term not elsewhere defined in the Patent
Code. 61 Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa determined
that the ordinary meaning would control, which would include in the Republic
all territorial waters. 62 Furthermore, within the EEZ, the court found that South
African law delineated extensive rights over installations. 63 Specifically, the
South African Maritimes Zone Act of 1994 states that “[a]ny law in force in the
Republic [of South Africa] . . . shall also apply on and in respect of an
installation” 64 where an installation is defined as being “situated within internal
waters, territorial waters or the exclusive economic zone or on or above the
continental shelf.” 65 The South African court determined that the South African
Patents Act applied to installations in the South Africa EEZ. 66 The apparatus
covered by the patent in this case was found to be an installation, and therefore
covered by the South African Patents Act, despite its location in the South
Africa EEZ. 67 The South African patent boundaries extend to all installations in
the EEZ, but do not apply to vessels in the EEZ. 68 Mobile offshore drilling units,
such as the GSF Development Driller I, are often classified as vessels. 69
Therefore, South African patent boundaries would not extend to a mobile oil rig
if the oil rig were classified as a vessel.
The question of whether the EEZ is under the United States patent
sovereignty was squarely before the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas, which held “that the high seas, including the Chukchi
Sea and the United States’ Exclusive Economic Zone (‘EEZ’), including the
EEZ in the Gulf of Mexico, are not U.S. territories or possessions for purposes
of the Patent Act.” 70 In a prior opinion in the same case, the court observed that
if patent infringement is to be found in the EEZ, it is up to Congress to explicitly
59. Id. (specifically “at a Soekor Field Development Project which is situated 95 nautical miles
off the South African coast (and therefore within the exclusive economic zone of the Republic) near
Mossel Bay”).
60. Id. at paras. 3–4.
61. Id.
62. Id. at paras. 4–5.
63. Id. at para. 7.
64. Maritimes Zone Act 15 of 1994 § 9(1) (S. Afr.).
65. Id. § 1(ii).
66. Schlumberger Logelco Inc v. Coflexip S A 2000 (3) SA 861 (SCA) at para. 8 (S. Afr.).
67. Id. at para. 8
68. Id. at para. 11.
69. See, e.g., McLaurin v. Noble Drilling (U.S.), Inc., 529 F.3d 285, 287 (5th Cir. 2008) (“The
vessel, a ‘mobile offshore drilling unit’ . . . .”); United States v. Transocean Deepwater Drilling Inc.,
936 F. Supp. 2d 818, 824 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (“There is also support for the proposition that a MODU
[mobile offshore drilling unit] continues to be a vessel even when it is temporarily attached to the
seabed for oil drilling.”).
70. See WesternGeco L.L.C. v. Ion Geophysical Corp. (WesternGeco III), 876 F. Supp. 2d 857,
907 (S.D. Tex. 2012).
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extend the patent boundaries through the definition of the United States found
in the Patent Code. 71 Within the United States EEZ lies the Chukchi Sea, where
a ship was alleged to infringe a patent assigned to WesternGeco. 72 The alleged
infringement took place on a ship located in the EEZ, not on the OCS, not
drilling into the OCS like the GSF Development Driller I oil rig, and not attached
to a pipeline or other installation. 73
In establishing the United States EEZ, President Reagan limited the scope
of United States sovereignty over the EEZ. 74 Patent infringement does not fall
within that limited sovereignty, which removes the possibility that the EEZ is
either a territory or a possession of the United States. 75 Furthermore, unlike the
legislatures of Australia and the United Kingdom, Congress has enacted no
legislation expressly extending the patent boundaries of the United States to the
EEZ. Transocean’s injunction does not cover the EEZ, and the GSF
Development Driller I can continue to operate without fear of repercussions
under United States patent law, and WesternGeco has no remedy under United
States patent law against a ship located within the EEZ. The Patent Code should
be clarified to state that the waters of the EEZ are not within the patent
boundaries of the United States.
D.

Outer Continental Shelf

The United States formally recognized sovereignty over the OCS in 1953. 76
The Submerged Lands Act gave the United States jurisdiction over the “subsoil
and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf and . . . all installations and other
devices permanently or temporarily attached to the seabed.” 77 The OCS includes
the “‘submerged lands’ beyond the extended state boundaries . . . but not the
waters above those submerged lands.” 78 The OCS is being addressed under the
Section on seas, although it is land, since it is addressed by the Law of the Sea,
and a nation’s rights over its EEZ and continental shelf overlap. Sovereignty is
greater over the continental shelf, despite the fact that it runs beneath the EEZ.
71. WesternGeco v. Ion Geophysical Corp. (WesternGeco II), No. 4:09–cv–1827, 2011 WL
3608382, at *11 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2011) (“Though the ordinary meaning of ‘possessions’ would
include areas within United States’ control, we believe that the United States’ circumscribed level of
control over the EEZ is insufficient to characterize it as a ‘possession’ of the United States.”).
72. The five patents at issue covered marine seismic data acquisition, which was performed on a
boat in the EEZ. WesternGeco I, 776 F. Supp. 2d 342, 346–47 (S.D. Tex. 2011). The alleged infringer
“applied for and received a Geological & Geophysical Permit from the U.S. Department of the
Interior” to study lease holdings in the Chukchi Sea located “in the Outer Continental Shelf (“OCS”),
approximately 100 miles northwest of Wainwright, Alaska, and 150 miles west of Barrow, Alaska.” Id.
at 347–48.
73. See id.
74. See supra note 42 and accompanying text for the language of Presidential Proclamation
5030.
75. WesternGeco I, 776 F. Supp. 2d at 368–69.
76. Submerged Lands Act, Pub. L. No. 83-31, § 3, 67 Stat. 29, 30 (1953) (codified at 43 U.S.C.
§ 1301–1356 (2012)).
77. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1).
78. Pacific Operators Offshore, LLP v. Valladolid, 132 S. Ct. 680, 685 (2012).
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The awkward nature of this fit leads to an equally awkward application of the
law, as discussed further below.
There is significant overlap between the continental shelf and the EEZ. 79
Under the Law of the Sea, nations may claim an EEZ of no more than 200
nautical miles beyond the coastline of a nation, 80 while the continental shelf 81
can extend no more than 350 nautical miles beyond the baseline of the territorial
sea. 82 Under the Law of the Sea, these geographical limits, which are based in a
historical understanding of fishing, shipping, and access of a nation to its
environmental resources, are different for the EEZ and the continental shelf. As
technology increases access to resources found in the continental shelf, claiming
sovereignty over a greater territory has risen in importance. For instance, in
1978, the United States and Mexico established maritime boundaries in the Gulf
of Mexico through the Treaty on Maritime Boundaries between the United
Mexican States and the United States of America. 83 At the time that treaty was
negotiated, the primary concern of the nations involved was fishing rights. The
tension between fishing rights and any potential for oil resources led to a
derailment of the treaty, and it was not ratified until nineteen years later, in
1997. 84 In 2012, when fishing rights were of less importance, and the focus of
Mexico and the United States had turned to the petroleum beneath the Gulf of
Mexico, a new treaty was negotiated between the two countries. This treaty, the
U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement, reflects the shift in focus
of the nations from the maritime rights in the EEZ to the hydrocarbon rights in
the OCS. 85 The boundaries negotiated in the 2012 treaty are based on the
interests of each nation in its continental shelf, and these rights have a more

79. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., OVERVIEW OF U.S. LEGISLATION AND REGULATIONS
AFFECTING OFFSHORE NATURAL GAS AND OIL ACTIVITY 6 (2005), available at http://www.eia.gov/
pub/oil_gas/natural_gas/feature_articles/2005/offshore/offshore.pdf (“About 15 percent of the U.S.
EEZ lies on the continental shelf in shallow waters less than 200 meters (656 feet) deep and another 10
to 15 percent lies in water depths of 200 to 2,000 meters (656 to 6,560 feet). The remaining 70 to 75
percent of the EEZ reaches water depths of up to 5,000 meters (16,404 feet). . . . In some instances . . .
jurisdiction over natural resources extends beyond the 200-mile boundary to the edge of the geological
continental margin based on geological factors such as sediment thickness and water depth. For this
reason the boundaries associated with Alaska, parts of the East Coast and the Gulf of Mexico extend
beyond 200 miles, but the Pacific coast has the standard EEZ boundary limits.”).
80. UNCLOS, supra note 19, arts. 55, 57.
81. The legal definition of the continental shelf is not necessarily the same as the geological
definition of the continental shelf.
82. The Law of the Sea limits the continental shelf to a distance of no more than “350 nautical
miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.” UNCLOS, supra
note 19, art. 76, ¶ 6.
83. David Applegate, Doughnut Holes in the Gulf of Mexico, BOUNDARY & SECURITY BULL.,
Autumn 1997, at 71, 71.
84. Id. at 71, 73.
85. Agreement Concerning Transboundary Hydrocarbon Reservoirs in the Gulf of Mexico,
U.S.-Mex., Feb. 20, 2012, http:// www.state.gov/documents/organization/185467.pdf.
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extensive geographic reach than any rights that could be based on each nation’s
EEZ. 86
Offshore drilling in deepwater and ultra-deepwater often uses mobile
offshore drilling units, such as the GSF Development Driller I. This cutting edge
technology is a rapidly evolving area, 87 rich in patentability questions, including
the question of whether United States patent law can be infringed by drilling on
the OCS. Mobile offshore drilling units can move from one drilling spot to the
next—as the name itself suggests—and so they are often classified as a vessel and
treated as registered to the nation whose flag they carry. 88 However, when
drilling, these units are necessarily attached to the seabed. 89 If that seabed is part
of the OCS and the unit is attached, albeit temporarily, to the OCS, a literal
reading of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) would place the
unit under limited federal jurisdiction. 90
Mobile drilling units provide an interesting hybrid of vessel and installment.
Unattached to the seabed, a mobile offshore drilling unit 91 is a vessel passing
through the EEZ. Once attached to the seabed, the mobile offshore drilling unit
is an installment for purposes of federal jurisdiction. 92 The very question of what
patent sovereignty the United States exercises over activities on a mobile oil rig
turns on whether the oil rig is attached to the seabed and drilling, or mobile in
the water.
86. See CURRY L. HAGERTY & JAMES C. UZEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43204, PROPOSED
U.S.-MEXICO TRANSBOUNDARY HYDROCARBON AGREEMENT: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR
CONGRESS 7–8 (2013).
87. See, e.g., A Brief History of Offshore Oil Drilling 1 (Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, Staff Working Paper No. 1, 2010).
88. Rebecca K. Richards, Note, Deepwater Mobile Oil Rigs in the Exclusive Economic Zone and
the Uncertainty of Coastal State Jurisdiction, 10 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 387, 388, 407 (2011).
89. The attachment may be temporary, but in order to drill, the oil rig must have access to the
seabed. Richards, supra note 88, at 396–97.
90. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a) (2012) (“The Constitution and laws and civil and political jurisdiction of
the United States are extended to the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf . . . .”).
91. The Code of Federal Regulations defines a “mobile offshore drilling unit or MODU [as] a
vessel, other than a public vessel of the United States, capable of engaging in drilling operations for
exploration or exploitation of subsea resources.” 33 CFR § 140.10 (2014). Once it is engaged in drilling
operations, the mobile offshore drilling unit becomes an OCS facility, defined as
any artificial island, installation, or other device permanently or temporarily attached to the
subsoil or seabed of the Outer Continental Shelf, erected for the purpose of exploring for,
developing, or producing resources therefrom, or any such installation or other device (other
than a ship or vessel) for the purpose of transporting such resources. The term includes
mobile offshore drilling units when in contact with the seabed of the OCS for exploration or
exploitation of subsea resources.
Id.
92. If this seems confusing, it is. In fact, this may have been an issue in the Deepwater Horizon
disaster. The chain of command for a ship at anchor, or attached to the seabed, is different from the
chain of command for a ship underway. See ANDREW MITCHELL, IN THE MATTER OF DEEPWATER
HORIZON: REPORT REGARDING TRANSOCEAN’S SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM AND THE ISM CODE
7 (2011), available at http://www.mdl2179trialdocs.com/releases/release201305171200030/TREX040011.pdf (stating that “[t]he Master of the Deepwater Horizon was incapable by virtue of the
Transocean command structure and inadequate training to make the right decisions at critical times”).
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In 1987, William Riles was granted a patent for a method of installing
offshore platforms for oil drilling. 93 The Hess Corporation was drilling on the
OCS, pursuant to a lease from the United States Government, including offshore
exploration projects in the “Garden Banks” 94 area of the OCS. 95 Mr. Riles
sought a declaratory judgment preventing the Hess Corporation from installing
the Garden Banks offshore platforms, alleging that the installations would
infringe his patent. 96 Is drilling on the OCS within the United States patent
boundaries? If the OCS were not within the United States, then Mr. Riles would
have had no case under United States patent law for infringement.
In 2009, WesternGeco brought a lawsuit alleging infringement of five of its
patents. Infringement was alleged to have occurred over one hundred miles off
the coast of Alaska on board a ship in the Chukchi Sea over the OCS. 97
WesternGeco also asked the court to find infringement involving a ship sailing in
the EEZ. 98 The site of the alleged infringement was found to be in the United
States EEZ, not on the OCS, because the infringement in WesternGeco took
place on a vessel traveling over the OCS. 99 Mr. Riles was concerned about
actions taking place on the OCS in the EEZ, while WesternGeco was concerned
about actions taking place in the EEZ, but not on the OCS. 100 There was
jurisdiction over Mr. Riles’ claim for infringement, but not over the claim made
by WesternGeco. The distinction between sailing in the EEZ and drilling on the
OCS is a distinction based in international law, treaties, and United States law. 101
The OCSLA extends a broad grant of federal subject matter jurisdiction to
the OCS, giving federal courts jurisdiction over all cases and controversies
arising out of “exploration, development, or production of the minerals, of the
93. Riles v. Amerada Hess Corp., 999 F. Supp. 938, 938 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
94. The Garden Banks areas are “two prominent geological features on the edge of the outer
continental shelf in the northwestern Gulf of Mexico, approximately 192 km southeast of Galveston,
Texas.” Flower Garden Banks, GULFBASE.ORG, http://www.gulfbase.org/reef/view.php?rid=fgb1 (last
visited May 15, 2015).
95. Riles, 999 F. Supp. at 938.
96. Id. at 939.
97. WesternGeco I, 776 F. Supp. 2d 342, 347–48 (S.D. Tex. 2011).
98. Id. at 364, 368–70.
99. Id. at 370.
100. See id. at 364 (indicating that WesternGeco contended that the allegedly infringing activity
occurred “within the Outer Continental Shelf . . . and the Exclusive Economic Zone . . . of the United
States”); Riles, 999 F. Supp. at 938 (indicating that the defendant’s activities included offshoreexploration projects on the Outer Continental Shelf).
101. There have been allegations that this distinction is part of what led to the Deepwater
Horizon disaster. See David Hammer, Deepwater Horizon Alarm Gave No Advance Warning of
Explosion, Rig Crew Member Says, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Oct. 5, 2010, 10:15 PM), http://blog.
nola.com/2010_gulf_oil_spill/print.html?entry=/2010/10/deepwater_horizon_alarm_gave_n.html (“The
Transocean policy is that a rig is run by its captain when it’s making way, but the top drilling official,
the offshore installation manager, is in control when the rig is latched onto a well.”); see also
MITCHELL, supra note 92, at 8 (“The way that Transocean describes the command structure in the
management system documentation is confusing and ambiguous, with many conflicting statements
about when and whether the Master is appointed as the [person in charge] during emergency
situations . . . .”).
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subsoil and seabed” of the OCS. 102 The statute covers drilling for oil in the OCS,
as long as the device is attached, either temporarily or permanently, to the OCS
seabed or substrate. Within these narrow limits, the OCS falls within the United
States patent boundaries. This aligns with how other countries have treated this
issue. In the United Kingdom, sections of the continental shelf have been
designated as under the purview of the Patents Act 1977. 103 In South Africa, the
court system determined that installations on the continental shelf fell within the
South African patent boundaries. 104 In the United States, an offshore oil rig is
attached to the OCS and is, therefore, an installation, even if the attachment is
only temporary, as long as the rig is drilling for oil 105 or otherwise physically
exploring the seabed or substrate. 106 If a vessel is mapping the seabed, with no
physical attachment to the bed, then the vessel is in the EEZ, and is not covered
by the OCSLA. Once attachment to the OCS occurs, temporary or permanent,
then the resulting activity is within the United States patent boundaries. 107
E.

High Seas

The Law of the Sea defines the “high seas” as “all parts of the sea that are
not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the
internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic
State.” 108 The United States Constitution gives Congress the power to “define
and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences

102. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–372, § 23(b)(1), 92 Stat. 629, 658
(codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1349(b)(1) (2012)); see also 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1) (“The Constitution and
laws and civil and political jurisdiction of the United States are extended to the subsoil and seabed of
the outer Continental Shelf and to all artificial islands, and all installations and other devices
permanently or temporarily attached to the seabed, which may be erected thereon for the purpose of
exploring for, developing, or producing resources therefrom.”).
103. See supra notes 51–56 and accompanying text for a discussion of how United Kingdom
patent law applies to the OCS.
104. See supra notes 57–69 and accompanying text for a discussion of how South Africa patent
law applies to the OCS.
105. This is true even if the oil rig is not anchored, but is using dynamic positioning in order to
stay attached to the OCS. As long as the oil rig is drilling, it is attached to the OCS. See United States
v. Kaluza, No. 12–265, 2013 WL 6490341, at *17 (E.D. La. Dec. 10, 2013), aff’d in part, 780 F.3d 647
(5th Cir. 2015) (stating that “a dynamically positioning semi-submersible rig may be an OCSLA situs
under 1333(a)(1)” if it is “‘erected’ on the OCS”).
106. See Tom Hamburger & Kim Geiger, Foreign Flagging of Offshore Rigs Skirts U.S. Safety
Rules, L.A. TIMES (June 14, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jun/14/nation/la-na-oil-inspection20100615 (“A deepwater oil rig floats above the well, connected by thousands of feet of pipe, and is
kept in position by thrusters and elaborate navigational systems.”).
107. The temporary presence exemption, set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 272, does not apply since the
technology is not being used exclusively for the needs of the vessel, but is instead being used to extract
oil for sale in or export from the United States. See J. Jonas Anderson, Hiding Behind Nationality: The
Temporary Presence Exception and Patent Infringement Avoidance, 15 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L.
REV. 1, 2–4 (2008) (discussing the scope and purpose of the temporary presence exception).
108. UNCLOS, supra note 19, art. 86.
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against the Law of Nations.” 109 The high seas are not territory of the United
States. 110
Willard Bascom patented a novel method of finding underwater objects. 111
He conceived of the idea of “equipping the end of a drill string in deep ocean
waters (from 12,000 to 20,000 feet or more below the ocean surface) with means
for viewing the ocean bottom in the vicinity of the end of the drill string” and
using this to survey the ocean floor. 112 With this information, “a search plan
could be developed for closer inspection, identification and retrieval of objects
from the floor of the ocean.” 113 The method can be used in any depth of water,
but “particularly applicable . . . to use at depths of the order of 20,000 feet below
the surface of the ocean.” 114
Bascom sued the United States government for patent infringement,
alleging that an “American-registered, U.S. Government owned and operated
vessel identified as the Glomar Explorer” made unauthorized use of his
method. 115 If the Glomar Explorer was on the high seas when the method was
practiced, did infringement under United States patent law occur?
Sovereignty of the United States over the high seas is strictly limited to
piracies, felonies, and offenses against the Law of Nations. 116 Patent
infringement falls into none of these categories. It is not piracy, not “[r]obbery
on the seas . . . an offence within the criminal jurisdiction of all nations.” 117 A
violation of United States patent law is neither a criminal act within the United
States nor a felony. It is not an offense against the Law of Nations. The Law of
Nations has been held to be synonymous with “customary international law.” 118
The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
defines “customary international law” as the “general and consistent practice of
states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.” 119 In a decision from

109. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
110. WesternGeco I, 776 F. Supp. 2d 342, 367 (S.D. Tex. 2011).
111. Ocean Science & Eng’g, Inc. v. United States, 595 F.2d 572, 573 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
112. Id. at 575.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 578.
115. Id. at 580.
116. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
117. United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184, 197 (1820); see also UNCLOS, supra note
19, art. 101 (“Piracy consists of any of the following acts: (a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or
any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship . . .
and directed: (i) on the high seas, against another ship . . . or against persons or property on board
such ship . . .; (ii) against a ship, . . . persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship . . . with knowledge of facts making it a
pirate ship . . . ; (c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph
(a) or (b).”); United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) 153, 153 (1820) (defining piracy as “[r]obbery,
or forcible depredation, upon the sea”).
118. United States v. Bellaizac-Hurtado, 700 F.3d 1245, 1251 (11th Cir. 2012); Abagninin v.
AMVAC Chem. Corp., 545 F.3d 733, 738 (9th Cir. 2008); Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233,
237 n.2 (2d Cir. 2003).
119. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 102(2) (1987).
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the Eleventh Circuit looking at drug trafficking offenses on the high seas, the
court wrote:
The text of the Offences Clause does not resolve the question
whether it limits the power of Congress to define and punish only those
violations of customary international law that were established at the
Founding or whether the power granted under the Clause expands and
contracts with changes in customary international law. The Supreme
Court has not resolved the issue in either of the two cases in which it
upheld federal statutes as a constitutional exercise of the power
granted under the Offences Clause. In both cases, the Court explained
that the conduct at issue had been condemned as a violation of the law
of nations since the time of the Founding. 120
Patent infringement was hardly a matter of international concern in 1789.
Territorial in nature, patent law and infringement varies widely from one
country to another. 121 It makes no sense for the Offenses Clause to serve as the
basis for outlawing patent infringement on the high seas. The patent boundaries
must be drawn closer to the United States.
It is true that evolving technology raises the question of patent infringement
on the high seas, but for now, the high seas must be outside the United States
patent boundaries, as acknowledged by the court in Ocean Science &
Engineering, Inc. v. United States. 122
The method used by the United States for this purpose and allegedly
infringing Bascom’s patent was operational only on the high seas—
outside the United States, as defined in the Patent Act as “the United
States of America, its territories and possessions.” Yet the Act protects
only against the manufacture, use, or sale of a patented invention
“within the United States.” 123
The court went on to state: “Perhaps the patent bar will note the possible
loophole in the coverage of the U.S. patent laws and will invite the attention of
Congress to it. Meanwhile, it is well to adjudicate cases on other grounds when
possible, as we do this case.” 124
Absent infringement on a country’s flagged ship, as addressed below, the
high seas are within no country’s patent boundaries. 125 The United States is not a
signatory to the Law of the Sea, but customary international law holds that
sovereignty over the high seas is strictly limited, and until that changes, the high
seas must lie outside the United States patent boundaries.

120. Bellaizac-Hurtado, 700 F.3d at 1253 (citations omitted).
121. See supra Part II.C for a comparison of patent law in the United States, United Kingdom,
Australia, and South Africa.
122. 595 F.2d 572 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
123. Ocean Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 595 F.2d at 573 (citations omitted); see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)
(2012).
124. Ocean Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 595 F.2d at 574.
125. WesternGeco I, 776 F. Supp. 2d 342, 367–68 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (“U.S. patent law . . . cannot
proscribe . . . direct infringement when it occurs upon the high seas.”).
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The Law of the Flag

“A ship, which bears a nation’s flag, is to be treated as a part of the territory
of that nation. A ship is a kind of floating island.” 126
Ships provide interesting qualifications to the issue of patent boundaries, as
ships move from one place to another, and pass in and out of the geographic
boundaries of many countries. During one voyage a ship may visit many
different ports of call, each with their own patent regulations, and having some
form of constancy, that the laws that apply to the ship are those of the flag the
ship flies, allows for a more efficient set of decisions to be made on board the
ship. To further promote this efficiency, the law of the flag states that, absent the
exceptions set forth below, a ship is governed by the laws of the nation whose
flag the ship bears, even in the territorial waters of another country. In other
words, patent infringement may not occur, even within the territorial waters of
the United States, if the infringement occurs on a foreign-flagged ship
temporarily present in the United States.
Companies may choose to register vessels in countries other than the
country where the company is based, or even where the ship is docked. 127
Foreign registration allows the ship to fly the flag of a nation with which the ship
has only a tenuous nexus. 128 International maritime law generally endorses the
law of the flag and holds that the law of the country whose flag the ship flies
governs a ship. 129 These “flags of convenience” may shelter a vessel from the
laws of the country where the vessel is located. 130 Ships that sail under a nation’s
flag “shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas.” 131
126. Patterson v. Eudora, 190 U.S. 169, 176 (1903) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
127. See H. Edwin Anderson, III, The Nationality of Ships and Flags of Convenience:
Economics, Politics, and Alternatives, 21 TUL. MAR. L.J. 139, 140 (1996) (“One of the premises of the
principle of freedom of the high seas is that all states have the right to grant nationality to a vessel in
accordance with national and international law. . . . [T]he flag state, the state granting nationality to a
vessel, has exclusive jurisdiction over that vessel on the high seas to the extent permitted by
international law.”); see also Hamburger & Geiger, supra note 106 (stating that companies can register
vessels “in unlikely places such as the Marshall Islands, Panama and Liberia—reducing the U.S.
government’s role in inspecting and enforcing safety and other standards”) (footnotes omitted).
128. See, e.g., U.S. COAST GUARD MINERALS MGMT. SERV., MARINE BOARD OF
INVESTIGATION INTO THE MARINE CASUALTY, EXPLOSION, FIRE, POLLUTION, AND SINKING OF
MOBILE OFFSHORE DRILLING UNIT DEEPWATER HORIZON, WITH LOSS OF LIFE IN THE GULF OF
MEXICO 21–22 APRIL 2010, at 37 (2010), available at http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg545/dw/exhib/
May%2026%20PDF.pdf (examination of Captain Carl Smith, in which he states that a vessel he was
on was “flagged out of U.K., and they were presented with a nineteen million dollar tax bill. So on
December 30th of that year, they changed their flag to Singapore, and then they paid the six thousand
dollar tax bill.”).
129. United States v. Jho, 534 F.3d 398, 405–06 (5th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he law of the flag
doctrine. . . . provides that a merchant ship is part of the territory of the country whose flag she flies,
and that actions aboard that ship are subject to the laws of the flag state.”).
130. See Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line, Ltd., 545 U.S. 119, 126 (2005) (“Despite the fact
that the cruises are operated by a company based in the United States, serve predominantly United
States residents, and are in most other respects United States-centered ventures, almost all of
[Norwegian Cruise Line’s] cruise ships are registered in other countries, flying so-called flags of
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As stated above, the law of the flag is the general rule. There are
exceptions. In 1920, the Eighteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution took effect. Prohibiting the transportation of alcohol within the
United States, this Amendment would carry extraterritorial impact if applied to
ships sailing between the United States and ports outside the United States. 132
Relying on the fact that alcohol had long been present on ships and in naval
history, several merchant ships sued the United States to enjoin application of
the National Prohibition Act to foreign-flagged vessels. 133 The merchant ships
learned that foreign-flagged ships traveling in United States waters may be
subject to United States law, if Congress expressly extends United States law to
foreign-flagged ships, or if the United States law exists to protect the “peace of
the port.” 134 The Supreme Court held:
A merchant ship of one country voluntarily entering the territorial
limits of another subjects herself to the jurisdiction of the latter. The
jurisdiction attaches in virtue of her presence, just as with other objects
within those limits. During her stay she is entitled to the protection of
the laws of that place and correlatively is bound to yield obedience to
them. Of course, the local sovereign may out of considerations of
public policy choose to forego the exertion of its jurisdiction or to exert
the same in only a limited way, but this is a matter resting solely in its
discretion. 135
Alcohol was prohibited on any ships that wished to enter the United States. In
2005, the Supreme Court upheld this rule, and found:
The general rule that United States statutes apply to foreign-flag ships
in United States territory is subject only to a narrow exception. Absent
a clear statement of congressional intent, general statutes may not
apply to foreign-flag vessels insofar as they regulate matters that
involve only the internal order and discipline of the vessel, rather than
the peace of the port. 136
This exception differentiates between regulation of the internal affairs of
the vessel and the peace of the port. In other words, the law of Panama would
regulate internal affairs on the GSF Development Driller I, including the
qualifications of the captain, and the law of the United States would regulate the
peace of the port, including criminal conduct on board. The next question is
whether patent law is an internal affair of a ship, or part of the peace of the port.
In other words, do the United States patent boundaries extend to foreign-flagged
convenience.”); Anderson, supra note 127, at 162–67 (addressing some of the environmental, safety,
and labor problems associated with flags of convenience).
131. UNCLOS, supra note 19, art. 92.
132. In fact, during prohibition, “several U.S. vessels, including two cruise liners, the M/V
RELIANCE and the M/V RESOLUTE, were reflagged in Panama to avoid the U.S. law banning the
sale of alcohol aboard U.S. ships.” Anderson, supra note 127, at 156.
133. Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 119 (1923); see also National Prohibition Act, Pub.
L. No. 66–66, 41 Stat. 305 (1919) (repealed 1935).
134. Spector, 545 U.S. at 130.
135. Cunard, 262 U.S. at 124.
136. Spector, 545 U.S. at 130.
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vessels in United States waters, or are those vessels subject only to the patent law
of their flagged nations? The question is one of very narrowly drawn lines,
indeed. In cases involving labor relations, the National Labor Relations Act has
been held to apply to relationships between foreign-flagged ships and American
longshoremen, but not to relationships between the foreign-flagged ships and
their foreign crew. 137 The narrowness of this distinction arises from the
presumption that
Congress intends no interference with matters that are primarily of
concern only to the ship and the foreign state in which it is registered.
It is also reasonable, however, to presume Congress does intend its
statutes to apply to entities in United States territory that serve,
employ, or otherwise affect American citizens, or that affect the peace
and tranquility of the United States, even if those entities happen to be
foreign-flag ships. 138
The Supreme Court weighed in on this issue in 1856. In Brown v.
Duchesne, 139 the patent at issue covered “a new and useful improvement in
constructing the gaff of sailing vessels.” 140 The alleged infringement was used “in
the gaffs of a French schooner, . . . built in France, and owned and manned by
French subjects . . . [while] upon a lawful voyage, under the flag of France,
from . . . one of the colonies of France, to Boston, and thence back” to the
French colony. 141 The patentee, a United States citizen, claimed infringement
when the Alcyon, the French vessel, was “lawfully in a port of the United
States.” 142 To further complicate matters, the improvement on board the Alcyon
had been done in a foreign port “and was authorized by the laws” of France. 143
Chief Justice Taney held that the patent act is “domestic in its character, and
necessarily confined within the limits of the United States. It confers no power
on Congress to regulate commerce, or the vehicles of commerce, which belong to
a foreign nation, and occasionally visit our ports in commercial pursuits.” 144 The
policy behind patent law is the promotion of science and the useful arts, not the
“right to interfere in foreign intercourse, or with foreign ships visiting our
ports.” 145 The Supreme Court held that on board a foreign-flagged ship in
United States waters, the patent law of the country whose flag the ship flies
apply. 146
Patent laws, with their strongly territorial nature, are primarily of concern
to the country of origin. It would be very difficult to say that patent law affects
the peace and tranquility of the United States, or its ports. Patent law has more
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 131–32.
Id.
60 U.S. 183 (1856).
Brown, 60 U.S. at 193.
Id.
Id. at 194.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 198.
Id. at 198–99.
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to do with the internal affairs of the vessel itself. United States patent boundaries
do not extend to foreign-flagged vessels—even when such vessels are present in
the United States. 147 Any claims of patent infringement on board GSF
Development Driller I would have to be brought under the patent law of
Panama—that is, if the GSF Development Driller I was a vessel afloat in the
waters off the United States, as opposed to an installation attached to the
OCS. 148 This represents the primary problem with drawing patent boundaries
based on the flags borne by a ship. The ship may be viewed as a “floating island,”
an extension of the nation whose flag it flies. However, often times that flag is
selected for reasons other than the connection between the vessel and the nation.
Often referred to as “flags of convenience” for this very reason, a ship may fly a
flag for tax purposes, or register in a particular nation to take advantage of its
favorable labor laws, or for environmental shelters. 149
The result of extending a nation’s patent boundaries, which is the correct
result, may lead to a poor fit between the patent law of a country and the
technology on board the ship. The Marshall Islands, for instance, are a popular
country in which to register ships and oil rigs, many of which cost millions of
dollars to build and encapsulate a wide range of technological innovations. 150 In
the Marshall Islands, “[t]he only intellectual property–related legislation relates
to locally produced music recordings.” 151 There is no patent law in the Marshall
Islands. The Marshall Islands may, therefore, provide a patent shelter for a
mobile offshore drilling rig seeking to avoid charges of patent infringement, or
for a shipborne mobile computing center modeled on the disclosure found in
Google’s patent for a “water-based data center.” 152
The law of the flag does protect United States–flagged ships, which have
long represented an extension of the sovereignty of the United States to the high
seas. A United States–flagged ship, regardless of its berth, port, or location on
the high seas, is under the territorial sovereignty of the United States and within
the United States patent boundaries. This supports the above limit on foreignflagged vessels, because if foreign-flagged vessels are subject to foreign laws,
even in the United States, the converse should also hold true, and United States–

147. WesternGeco I, 776 F. Supp. 2d 342, 367 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (stating that although United
States patent law may cover infringement “occurring upon a U.S. flag vessel on the high seas, . . . no
court has extended this holding to foreign flag vessels on the high seas”) (citation omitted).
148. See supra notes 105–07 and accompany text for an explanation of the significance of this
distinction under United States patent law.
149. See Anderson, supra note 127, at 162–67 (detailing environmental and labor concerns
raised by flags of convenience).
150. See Hamburger & Geiger, supra note 106 (noting that companies can register vessels “in
unlikely places such as the Marshall Islands, Panama and Liberia—reducing the U.S. government’s
role in inspecting and enforcing safety and other standards”).
151. BUREAU OF ECON. & BUS. AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2012 INVESTMENT CLIMATE
STATEMENT - MARSHALL ISLANDS (2012), available at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2012/
191946.htm.
152. Water-Based Data Ctr., U.S. Patent No. 7,525,207 (filed Feb. 26, 2007).
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flagged vessels should be subject to United States laws, even when on the high
seas or elsewhere.
In 1865, a challenge was brought alleging infringement of an “improvement
in the sails of vessels.” 153 The alleged infringer “applied the patented
improvement to one of the sails of [his] vessel, on [the vessel’s] passage from
Liverpool to New York.” 154 The ship was an American vessel, and the
improvement was made to the sail on the high seas. 155 The court held that “[t]he
patent laws of the United States afford no protection to inventions beyond or
outside of the jurisdiction of the United States; but this jurisdiction extends to
the decks of American vessels on the high seas, as much as it does to all the
territory of the country.” 156 Since 1865, it has become clear that there is no
simple answer to the question of jurisdiction over these “floating islands” of
territory. The exception to United States sovereignty for foreign-flagged ships in
American waters would suggest that an extension be made to United States–
flagged ships in non-American waters. The Supreme Court has upheld that
extension, but as the Court of Claims points out, Congress has not clearly
extended the scope of the Patent Act to include American ships on nonAmerican waters. Looking to international law for guidance provides no greater
clarity. The law of the flag has a vast following, and is perhaps the easiest source
to look to for purposes of efficiency and clarity, even as it varies based on the
character of the jurisdiction and laws being applied. Under the law of the flag, it
must be that American patent boundaries extend to American ships in nonAmerican waters. Therefore, if a United States–flagged vessel obeys United
States patent law, it should not be charged with patent infringement for docking
in another country. Conversely, if a United States–flagged vessel wishes to
benefit from that ruling, the same vessel must be willing to submit to United
States patent law, no matter where the ship may be found. Once again, the
United States patent boundaries are not strictly geographical—they are limited
by the purpose of patent law as well as by the geography of the United States.
III. IN THE AIR
In 2004, test pilot Mike Melvill flew the rocket plane SpaceShipOne more
than 100 kilometers above California, achieving weightlessness and earning the
first pair of commercial astronaut’s wings from the Federal Aviation
Administration. 157 If Mr. Melvill used a camera to take pictures from
SpaceShipOne and in doing so infringed a patent, would it matter at what height
above the United States he took those pictures? In other words, could he
infringe a patent in United States airspace, and not infringe in outer space? What
is the demarcation between the two?
153. Gardiner v. Howe, 9 F. Cas. 1157, 1157 (C.C.D. Mass. 1865) (No. 5,219).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1158.
157. Michael Coren, Private Craft Soars into Space, History, CNN.COM (July 14, 2004, 4:14
AM), http://www.cnn.com/2004/TECH/space/06/21/suborbital.test/.
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Virgin Galactic is selling tickets to fly into space. 158 Drones are on the
evening news, being used by traffic reporters, home aviation enthusiasts, and the
federal government. 159 A new commercial Mid-Atlantic Regional Spaceport
(MARS) has been built in Virginia. 160 As the technology advances, so changes
the question of what constitutes patent infringement. Patent infringement must
occur within the United States. How high does the United States reach? The
discussion below sets forth the airscape of United States patent boundaries.
A.

Airspace

In 2010, Raytheon filed for a patent titled “Systems & Methods for
Collision Avoidance in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.” 161 The claims cover a
collision-avoidance system contained on board an unmanned aerial vehicle, i.e.,
a drone. Raytheon’s drones can autonomously avoid collisions. 162 The method
takes place in air, never touching ground. Can this patent be infringed by an
unauthorized operation of this device in the United States?
Air is not the same thing as airspace. 163 Air, as in the oxygen, nitrogen,
argon, and carbon dioxide that constitute the atmosphere, is a common good,
belonging to no one and no party. There are no property rights associated with
air. Airspace on the other hand, does carry with it property rights. The
landowner owns the airspace above land. 164
158. Booking, VIRGIN GALACTIC, http://staging.virgingalactic.com/booking/ (last visited May
15, 2015) (“All seats to fly to space are US $250,000 and deposits are refundable.”); see also Timothy
Stenovec, Space Tourism Expected to be $1 Billion Industry over Next 10 Years, Says FAA, HUFFPOST,
(Mar. 22, 2012, 9:43 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/22/space-tourism-1-billion-industry_
n_1371354.html (“Ashton Kutcher was the 500th person to sign up for a $200,000 ride aboard Virgin
Galactic’s Space Ship Two.”).
159. See Leslie Kaufman & Ravi Somaiya, Drones Offer Journalists a Wider View, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 25, 2013, at B1 (explaining that drones have mostly been used by the military, but “are
increasingly being used for civilian purposes”).
160. E.g., Melanie D.G. Kaplan, Walloped by a Rocket Launch on Virginia’s Wallops Island,
WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/travel/walloped-by-a-rocketlaunch-on-virginias-wallops-island/2014/01/23/cd0e245a-82de-11e3-8099-9181471f7aaf_story.html.
161. Systems & Methods for Collision Avoidance in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, U.S. Patent
No. 8,378,881 (filed Oct. 18, 2010).
162. Id. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has announced plans to allow drones to
enter the national airspace. Timothy T. Takahashi, Drones in the National Airspace, 77 J. AIR L. &
COM. 489, 492 (2012). Drones were previously banned from national airspace out of a concern for
midair collisions between drones and airplanes. Id. at 494. Numerous companies, including Raytheon,
are working on autonomous collision-avoidance systems, increasing drone safety, and supporting the
FAA’s plans to allow drones into our national airspace. Craig Whitlock, Near-Collisions Between
Drones, Airliners Surge, New FAA Reports Show, WASH. POST (Nov. 26, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/near-collisions-between-drones-airlinerssurge-new-faa-reports-show/2014/11/26/9a8c1716-758c-11e4-bd1b-03009bd3e984_story.html.
163. See, e.g., John Cobb Cooper, Roman Law and the Maxim Cujus Est Solum in International
Air Law, 1 MCGILL L.J. 23, 36 (1952) (“The distinction between ‘air’ and ‘airspace’ was as clear in
Roman law as it is today. The legal status of the air (or atmosphere) which men breathed was not the
same as that of the space through which the air circulated.”).
164. See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *18 (William Draper Lewis ed., 1902)
(“Land hath also, in its legal signification, an indefinite extent, upwards as well as downwards.”); 1
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Ownership of airspace first became an issue when advances in
transportation raised the question of who had the rights to fly where. 165 Fliers
claimed the right to fly everywhere, and landowners claimed the right to exclude
aircraft from the airspace over their land. 166 The 1919 Paris Convention for
Regulation of Aerial Navigation “recognized the ‘complete and exclusive
sovereignty’ of the subjacent State over the airspace above its territory,” and
with that came the right to exclude aircraft from that airspace. 167 The United
States was not a party to this treaty, but in 1938 Congress enacted the Civil
Aeronautics Act, stating:
The United States of America is hereby declared to possess and
exercise complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the air space
above the United States, including the air space above all inland waters
and the air space above those portions of the adjacent marginal high
seas, bays, and lakes, over which by international law or treaty or
convention the United States exercises national jurisdiction. 168
Today, that colorful description has been reduced to simpler language, and
the current statute states: “The United States Government has exclusive
sovereignty of airspace of the United States.” 169 Subsequently, in United States v.
Causby, 170 the Supreme Court held:
The air is a public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not
true, every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to
countless trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To
recognize such private claims to the airspace would clog these
highways, seriously interfere with their control and development in the
public interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only
the public has a just claim. 171
Looking back at the definition of the United States, under 35 U.S.C.
§ 100(c), 172 the United States possesses the airspace of the United States, and
therefore, Raytheon can bring suit for infringement of its autonomous drones,
should such an occasion arise. The patent boundaries of the United States extend
EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND ch. 1, sec. 1, 4.a. (Francis Hargrave & Charles
Butler eds., 19th ed. 1853) (“For as the heavens are the habitation of Almightie God, so the earth hath
he appointed as the suburbs of heaven to be the habitation of man . . . the earth hath he given to the
children of men.”); 3 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *401 (John M. Gould ed.,
14th ed. 1896) (explaining that land “has an indefinite extent, upwards as well as downwards, so as to
include everything terrestrial, under or over it”).
165. STUART BANNER, WHO OWNS THE SKY? THE STRUGGLE TO CONTROL AIRSPACE FROM
THE WRIGHT BROTHERS ON 15 (2008).
166. Id.
167. Robert L. Bridge, International Law and Military Activities in Outer Space, 13 AKRON L.
REV. 649, 650 (1980).
168. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75–706, § 1107(i)(3), 52 Stat. 973, 1028,
(repealed by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958).
169. 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a)(1) (2012).
170. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
171. Causby, 328 U.S. at 261.
172. See 35 U.S.C. § 100(c) (2012) (defining the United States as, “The United States of
America, its territories and possessions”).
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to the air above the United States. This includes the territorial limits set forth in
the Section on land boundaries below, and the airspace over the United States
territorial seas. 173 The question is how far up does the airspace go. The United
States has limits over the reach of its sovereignty, and the sky may be the limit. 174
B.

Outer Space

In 1967, the United Nations adopted the Outer Space Treaty, which states:
“Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to
national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation,
or by any other means.” 175 The United States does not own the space above it
extending out to infinity, but the airspace above the United States is under
national sovereignty. This begs the question: where is the line between airspace
and outer space?
The question is far from a new one—over forty years ago, one author
commented:
What is the definition of outer space? Or, more specifically, what is
the difference between national air space and outer space? . . . How is
one to be distinguished from the other? The question has received
much attention in recent years, and many proposals on how it might be
resolved have been put forward. A great deal has also been written on
the subject, and several publications of the United Nations have
discussed it at some length. As yet, no consensus has emerged.
However, the progress of technology may make some solution more
urgent in coming years. An arbitrary decision may be the only feasible
answer. 176
Unlike the Law of the Sea, there is no international treaty that sets forth
limits, nor is there clear international demarcation precedent. In fact, there is not
even international agreement that it is yet necessary to “define or delimit
airspace and outer space” since the absence of such definitions has not yet been
an impediment to space activities. 177 Australia is the only country to codify a
demarcation, having determined that national sovereignty ends 100 kilometers

173. Sovereignty over the EEZ is recognized internationally as being limited and, as discussed
above, the patent boundaries extend neither to the EEZ, nor to the airspace above it.
174. See Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442, 447 (E.D. Ark. 1959) (“[A] time may come, and
may not be far distant, when commercial aircraft will fly at altitudes so high that it would be unrealistic
to consider them as being within the territorial limits of the United States or of any particular State
while flying at such altitudes.”).
175. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. II, opened for signature Jan. 27,
1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 2015 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
176. Raymond J. Barrett, Outer Space and Air Space: The Difficulties in Definition, AIR UNIV.
REV., May–June 1973, available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/afri/aspj/airchronicles/aureview/1973/MayJun/barrett.html.
177. U.N. Secretariat, Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Questions on the Definition
and Delimitation of Outer Space: Replies from Member States, 4, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/889/Add. 10
(Feb. 21, 2012) (Norway Response).
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above Australia. 178 The United States has expressly stated that it “is firmly of the
view that there is no need to seek a legal definition or delimitation for outer
space.” 179 Russia believes a definition needs to be set forth in an international
treaty that will be legally binding on the signing parties, but has not yet codified
such a definition domestically. 180
The ambiguity in the demarcation between airspace and outer space is
based on the natural lack of a boundary between the two. 181 In both space and at
sea, there are natural demarcations ranging from the currents to the layers of the
atmospheres, to the continental shelf, to the effect of gravity, but there are no
tactile boundaries. As discussed above, however, boundaries in the seas are set
forth in UNCLOS. Ships transverse the seas to ferry goods and people between
countries. 182 No convention exists defining outer space. 183 Goods and people are
not routinely ferried through outer space. In order to cross the airspace of
another country, permission of that nation must be granted, since sovereignty
extends over a country’s airspace. 184 At one point in history, Russia claimed that
sovereignty had no national height limits. When Sputnik launched and orbited
over many nations, Russia quietly dropped that argument. 185 If permission had
to be granted every time a satellite orbited over a nation, the cost and expense
would be tremendous.
In recognition of this cost, and despite the Outer Space Treaty, there have
been attempts to claim outer space sovereignty and, therefore, to profit off of
satellite orbits. In 1976, the Bogota Declaration, signed by eight equatorial
countries, 186 laid claim to “the segments of the synchronous geostationary orbit
[which] are an integral part of the territory over which the equatorial States
exercise their national sovereignty.” 187 Geostationary synchronous orbit, also
178. Jenifer K. Lamie, Who Cares About the Demarcation Line Between Airspace and Outer
Space?, A.B.A. SCITECH LAW., Summer 2012, at 18, 18 n.4.
179. Statement by Mark Simonoff, United States Representative to the Legal Subcommittee of
the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Regarding the Definition and
Delimitation of Outer Space and the Character and Utilization of the Geostationary Orbit, April 2006,
available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/2006/98774.htm.
180. U.N. Secretariat, Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, supra note 177, at 5–6.
181. See Michael Listner, Could Commercial Space Help Define and Delimitate the Boundaries
of Outer Space?, SPACE REV. (Oct. 29, 2012), http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2180/1.
182. This is one of the reasons so many countries have signed the Law of the Sea. Negotiating
the rights of passage between nations is easier when the rules are set forth in international treaties.
Again, this has not been a concern in outer space, as no significant challenge has been raised regarding
the overflight of satellites.
183. Dean N. Reinhardt, The Vertical Limit of State Sovereignty, 72 J. AIR L. & COM. 65, 66
(2007).
184. In 1996, North Korea agreed to allow international airflight through its airspace for the
first time. Previously, aircraft had to fly around North Korea. North Korea to Open Its Airspace to
Others, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1996, http://www.nytimes.com/1996/08/03/world/north-korea-to-open-itsairspace-to-others.html.
185. Bridge, supra note 167, at 651.
186. Specifically the countries included Brazil, Colombia, Congo, Ecuador, Indonesia, Kenya,
Uganda, and Zaire. The Bogota Declaration, 6 J. SPACE L. 193, 196 (1978).
187. Id. at 193.
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known as geosynchronous orbit, is a section of space found at a specific height
over the equator. 188 There are a limited number of such orbits, and
communications satellites benefit from maintaining a geostationary orbit,
rendering these orbits valuable. The signatory countries declared:
[T]he synchronous geostationary orbit is a physical fact arising from
the nature of our planet, because its existence depends exclusively on
its relation to gravitational phenomena caused by the Earth, and that
for that reason it must not be considered part of outer space.
Therefore, the segments of synchronous geostationary orbit are an
integral part of the territory over which equatorial States exercise their
national sovereignty. 189
As another observer has written, the “logic of such a statement is obscure,
but bears a similarity to the ‘sector’ claims of Chile and Argentina to parts of
Antarctica.” 190 The Bogota Declaration remains extant, but has no effect. 191 This
is because it is in conflict with the Outer Space Treaty, which proscribes any
claim to sovereignty over outer space, including geostationary orbit. 192 Instead,
the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), an agency of the United
Nations, regulates the geosynchronous orbit landscape. 193 The ITU has
subdivided the geosynchronous orbit into longitudinal slots, and each country
has first rights to those longitudinal slots above their airspace. 194 There are

188. Lawrence D. Roberts, A Lost Connection: Geostationary Satellite Networks and the
International Telecommunication Union, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1095, 1099 (2000) (“For example,
the International Space Station typically orbits at 250 miles above the surface and makes one complete
orbit approximately every ninety minutes. In contrast, a satellite placed in an orbit 22,300 miles above
the Earth will take precisely one day to complete a single circuit. Such an object is considered to be
geosynchronous. If a spacecraft is placed in this 22,300 mile orbit directly above the Earth’s equator,
the satellite’s orbit is not merely synchronized with the Earth’s rotation but will appear from the
surface to be stationary. For this reason, this specific orbit is commonly known as the ‘geostationary
orbit.”) (footnotes omitted).
189. The Bogota Declaration, supra note 186, at 193.
190. FRANCIS LYALL & PAUL B. LARSEN, SPACE LAW: A TREATISE 253 (2009).
191. Id. at 255 (“No space-competent state has accepted its validity or complied with its
requirements for permission to place a satellite in a geostationary orbital slot claimed by an equatorial
state to be under its jurisdiction.”).
192. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 175, art. II; see also Kyle A. Jacobsen, Comment, From
Interstate to Interstellar Commerce: Incorporating the Private Sector into International Aerospace Law,
87 TEMP. L. REV. 159, 159–62 (2014) (proposing amendments to the Outer Space Treaty that will
accommodate the growing space tourism industry while accommodating the needs of nonspacefaring
countries).
193. About ITU, ITU, http://www.itu.int/en/about/Pages/default.aspx (last visited May 15, 2015).
194. This is not without controversy. The United States has officially stated that it
cannot agree with those that argue that the GSO is or can be subjected to the sovereignty of
States or that States may have preferential rights to the use of such orbits. We remain
committed to the position that because this orbit, at approximately 36,000 kilometers above
the earth, is in outer space, its use is governed by the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. . . . Thus, a
signatory to this Treaty cannot appropriate a position in the GSO either by claim of
sovereignty or by means of use, or even repeated use, of such an orbital position.
Agenda Item 6: Definition and Delimitation of Outer Space and the Character and Utilization of the
Geostationary Orbit, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (2001), http://www.state.gov/s/l/22718.htm.
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currently estimated to be 465 satellites in geosynchronous orbit, each occupying
a longitudinal slot. 195 Thirty-six percent of all active satellites are estimated to be
in this orbit, with another fifty-two percent in low earth orbit, an orbit between
geostationary orbit and Earth. 196 If sovereignty can be declared over these two
orbits, then nearly ninety percent of all satellites could be under national
governance. 197 It is, thus, important to understand the demarcation between
outer space, and the absence of sovereignty, and airspace, subject to national
sovereignty.
As with the Law of the Sea, any such demarcation may well be arbitrary. 198
The United States, despite not recognizing an official delineation, has codified a
definition of “launch” in its National and Commercial Space Launch Activities
bill, known as the Commercial Space Launch Act. 199 Under the Act,
“launch” means to place or try to place a launch vehicle or reentry
vehicle and any payload, crew, or space flight participant from Earth—
(A) in a suborbital trajectory;
(B) in Earth orbit in outer space; or
(C) otherwise in outer space. 200
Contrast this definition with Australia’s definition set forth in its Space Activities
Act of 1998: “launch a space object means launch the object into an area beyond
the distance of 100 km above mean sea level, or attempt to do so.” 201 To avoid
codifying a definition is to avoid answering the important and fundamental
questions of what laws apply and what rights exist in the atmosphere.
There are two primary schools of thought on how to draw the line between
airspace and outer space. The functional approach asks what is the function of
the vessel in question. If it is an aircraft, then the law of the air should govern it.
If it is a spacecraft, then the law of outer space should govern it. This
functionality is recognized in the language of “space flight” used in the
Commercial Space Launch Act. 202 It is more formally recognized in Australia’s
use of the 100 kilometers demarcation, which is based on the “von Karman line.”
The “von Karman line” is “the altitude, approximately 100 kilometers, where the
atmosphere is too thin for an airplane’s wings to generate the aerodynamic lift

195. UCS Satellite Database, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, http://www.ucsusa.org/
nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/space_weapons/technical_issues/ucs-satellite-database.html
(last visited May 15, 2015).
196. See id. (estimating that of the 1,265 operating satellites, 465 are operating in
geosynchronous orbit, and 669 are operating in low earth orbit).
197. Id.
198. See Lamie, supra note 178, at 18 n.4 (indicating that Australia has codified demarcation at
100 kilometers).
199. Commercial Space Launch Act, Pub. L. No. 98-575, § 4(2), 98 Stat. 3055, 3056 (1984)
(codified as amended at 51 U.S.C. § 50902(4) (2012)).
200. 51 U.S.C. § 50902(4) (2012).
201. Space Activities Act 1998 pt 2 s 8 (Austl.).
202. Commercial Space Launch Act, 51 U.S.C. §§ 50901–50923. While “space flight” is not
defined in the Act, other definitions in the Act distinguish between suborbital flights and launches into
“outer space.” See id. § 50902(4)(A)–(B).
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necessary to sustain flight.” 203 This has been recognized as the delineating line
between airspace and outer space by the Federation Aeronautique
Internationale, “a non-governmental and non-profit making international
organisation with the basic aim of furthering aeronautical and astronautical
activities worldwide, ratifying world and continental records and coordinating
the organisation of international competitions.” 204 The von Karman line allows
for a determination of the function of the vessel. Essentially, like the Law of the
Sea, nations could draw a boundary, and determine the limits of their
sovereignty based on the function of the craft in question, and the distance from
the ground the craft operates.
The second school of thought, the spatial approach, focuses on the policy
behind the Outer Space Treaty, and seeks to protect the freedom of all countries
to explore and exploit outer space. There is also a school of thought that says a
combination of these approaches may make the most sense. This lack of
agreement is reflected in the variety of approaches taken by countries in either
defining or declining to define outer space. In the United Kingdom,
[d]uring an October 1999 session of the U.K. House of Lords . . .
the Minister of State, Department of the Environment, Transport, and
the Regions[] said that “the UK does not have a working definition of
the upper limit of UK airspace, but for practical purposes the limit is
considered to be at least as high as any aircraft can fly.” 205
Germany’s Law Concerning Air Navigation defines “aircraft” as including
spacecraft and rockets. 206 South Africa has restricted airspace to “the maximum
height at which aircraft can ‘derive support from the atmosphere.’” 207 “Outer
space” is defined by South Africa as “the space above the surface of the earth
from a height at which it is in practice possible to operate an object in an orbit
around the earth.” 208 Basing the definition of outer space on technology defies
any concept of geographic boundaries, and brings extra challenges to any judicial
determination of the patent boundaries of South Africa. Should airspace be
defined as of the date of invention, as of the date of infringement, or as of the
date of the lawsuit? With evolving technology, aircraft can derive support from
the atmosphere at greater heights than ever before. SpaceShipOne, for example,
blurs the lines between spacecraft and aircraft. 209
There is no convention defining outer space, but despite this lack of a
formal definition, informally at least, the von Karman line appears to be the

203. Lamie, supra note 178, at 18.
204. About FAI, FAI (July 20, 2014 10:24 PM), http://www.fai.org/about-fai.
205. Reinhardt, supra note 183, at 83–84.
206. Id. at 82.
207. Id. at 83.
208. Id.
209. SpaceShipOne is a “three-place, high-altitude research rocket, designed for sub-orbital
flights to 100 km altitude.” Robert Valdes, How SpaceShipOne Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS (June 20,
2004), http://science.howstuffworks.com/spaceshipone2.htm. It “transforms into three different
configurations during the course of its flight. These configurations put SpaceShipOne in the ideal
shape for boost, entry and landing.” Id.
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default for a demarcation between the territorial airspace over which a nation
can exercise sovereignty and outer space which remains free for all nations. The
von Karman line, at least, provides guidance for where the demarcation should
be, even if the 100-kilometer mark is somewhat arbitrary. 210 The functional
approach aligns with congressional delineations in areas outside of patent law.
Under 18 U.S.C. § 7, Congress distinguishes its territorial claims between “[a]ny
aircraft belonging in whole or in part to the United States, or any citizen thereof,
or to any corporation created by or under the laws of the United States, or any
State, Territory, district, or possession thereof” and “[a]ny vehicle used or
designed for flight or navigation in space.” 211
The airspace above the United States is under national sovereignty. Outer
space is not within the United States. Until Congress holds otherwise, any
interpretation of the patent boundaries should be informed by international
standards. 212 If unauthorized use of Raytheon’s drone occurred in outer space,
no charge of infringement could be brought. 213
C.

Space Objects

Congress has extended United States patent law “to applicable activities
conducted in outer space.” 214 Inventions in outer space are expressly “within the
United States” if the invention is “made, used or sold in outer space on a space
object or component thereof under the jurisdiction or control of the United
States” unless the “space object . . . is specifically identified and otherwise
provided for by an international agreement” or the space object is registered to a
foreign state. 215 The statute is intentionally broad in its coverage, using the term
“space object” rather than “space vehicle” to avoid narrowing any interpretation
of the scope of the statute. 216 This statute extends the United States patent
boundaries to include space objects registered to the United States—but not the
outer space surrounding those objects. The law has yet to be relied on in a
judicial decision.

210. Dan Kois, Where Does Space Begin?, SLATE (Sept. 30, 2004, 1:31 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2004/09/where_does_space_begin.html; see
also Jeff Foust, SpaceShipOne Makes History – Barely, SPACE REV. (June 24, 2004),
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/167/2 (“There is nothing that significant about 100 km;
conditions there are little different than at 95 or 105 km. Indeed, it is not the only definition for space:
the Air Force (and now the FAA) award astronaut wings for those who exceed an altitude of 50 miles
(80.5 km). However, thanks in large part to the X Prize, 100 km is now perceived by the media and the
public as the boundary of space, an imaginary line where the final frontier begins.”).
211. 18 U.S.C. § 7(5)–(6) (2012).
212. See Reinhardt, supra note 183, at 86 (“In various sections of the U.S. Code, the term ‘outer
space’ is used in the definition of other terms but is not itself specifically defined.”).
213. See supra notes 161–62 for a discussion of Raytheon’s drone.
214. JOSEPH BIDEN, INVENTIONS IN OUTER SPACE, S. REP. NO. 101-266, at 6 (1990).
215. 35 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012).
216. S. REP. NO. 101-266, at 6–7 (stating that the term space object is used rather than space
vehicle “to avoid the possibility that the term ‘vehicle’ may be interpreted more restrictively than the
term ‘object’”).
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The only definition of a “space object” given in the United Nations
Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space is a circular
one defining “space object” in terms of itself. “The term ‘space object’ includes
component parts of a space object as well as its launch vehicle and parts
thereof . . . .” 217 Like the term outer space, the term space object is in need of
further interpretive guidance. A broad definition should be used until such time
as Congress or the judicial system provides a narrower one, given the legislative
history of section 105 of the Patent Act. A space object should be any object in
space—debris, spacecraft, satellites—and all such objects fall within the United
States patent boundaries if registered to the United States.
The question of patent boundaries in outer space remains a hypothetical
question for now, not having yet been challenged in court—however, it is a
question ever increasing in relevance and importance. 218 In 2009, the
Commander of the Joint Functional Component Command for Space told the
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, of the House Committee on Science
and Technology:
In 1980 only 10 countries were operating satellites in space. Today,
nine countries operate spaceports, more than 50 countries own or have
partial ownership in satellites and citizens of 39 nations have traveled
in space. In 1980 we were tracking approximately 4,700 objects in
space; 280 of those objects were active payloads/spacecraft, while
another 2,600 were debris. Today we are tracking approximately 19,000
objects; 1,300 active payloads and 7,500 pieces of debris. In 29 years,
space traffic has quadrupled.
It’s challenging to accurately predict the growth of active payload
space traffic and debris. In addition to the growth of national security
and commercial satellites from existing and new space-faring nations,
we believe the global diffusion of space technologies, especially the
availability of small spacecraft technologies and providers, will lead to
a larger and more diverse population of active spacecraft.
Based on the last 10 years of launch activity, we conservatively
project the number of active satellites to grow from 1,300 to 1,500 over
the next 10 years. We also estimate the overall number of tracked
objects could increase from 19,000 to as much as 100,000. 219
In 2013, over two hundred space objects were launched into outer space. 220
Of these, only 154 objects were registered with the United Nations Secretariat, in

217. Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Sept. 15, 1976, 28
U.S.T. 695, T.I.A.S. 8480; 1023 U.N.T.S. 15.
218. See generally Dan L. Burk, Application of United States Patent Law to Commercial Activity
in Outer Space, 6 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 295 (1991) (providing an earlier
discussion of how patent law might apply in outer space).
219. Keeping the Space Environment Safe for Civil and Commercial Users: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Space and Aeronautics, H. Comm. on Sci. & Tech., 111th Cong. 22 (2009) (statement of
Lt. Gen. Larry D. James, Commander, Joint Functional Component Command for Space).
220. See Online Index of Objects Launched into Outer Space, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR
OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS, http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/search.do (last visited on May 15, 2015). These
new launches add to the more “than 500,000 pieces of debris, or ‘space junk,’ . . . tracked as they orbit
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accordance with the United Nations Registration Convention. 221 For the 154
registered objects, the domestic law of the registering country covers them. 222
This allows flags of convenience for space objects. In other words, if a space
object is registered to Azerbaijan, 223 use of a microchip that could potentially
infringe a United States patent would be sheltered from infringement on the
Azerbaijan space object, presuming no patent issued in Azerbaijan. 224 This is
true even if a United States company is the one that launched the space object
and registered it in Azerbaijan. 225 Ships are already choosing national
registration based on factors other than the location of corporate headquarters.
Will space objects be the new frontier, creating patent shelters in outer space?
Furthermore, fifty-five objects were launched unregistered in 2013 and perhaps
are subject to no country’s domestic laws. An analogy can be made between
unregistered space objects and ships that sail the earth’s oceans absent a flag or
registration, “stateless ships.” This analogy, however, does not clarify the
application of law to the space object, as it remains unclear what laws apply to

the Earth. They all travel at speeds up to 17,500 mph, fast enough for a relatively small piece of orbital
debris to damage a satellite or a spacecraft.” Space Debris and Human Spacecraft, NASA (Sept. 27,
2013), http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/news/orbital_debris.html#.Uu-2Cnm4mlI. At this
point, there are so many objects in outer space that the Japanese Space Agency, JAXA, plans to
launch a garbage collector into outer space with the aim of capturing debris before satellites become
endangered. JAXA’s “garbage truck” is a giant net that will orbit Earth, gather debris and space
objects through an electromagnetic charge. After the net is full, it will be slowed down and fall back to
Earth where the net, the debris, and the spacecraft will burn up in Earth’s atmosphere. See Aviva
Hope Rutkin, Gone Junk Fishing, NEW SCIENTIST, Jan. 22, 2014, at 19; Michael Listner, A Brief Look
at the Legal and Political Implications of Japan’s Space Debris Removal Plans, SPACE REV. (Jan. 27,
2014), http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2441/1.
221. The Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space was adopted in
1974 by the United Nations. See Frans G. von der Dunk, The Registration Convention: Background
and Historical Context, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-SIXTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER
SPACE, 2003, at 450, available at http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/spacelaw/32.
222. See Edmond Boullé, Do We Have a Problem? IP Protection in Outer Space, WORLD
INTELL. PROP. REV. (Jan. 9, 2013), http://www.worldipreview.com/article/do-we-have-a-problem-ipprotection-in-outer-space.
223. See Online Index of Objects Launched into Outer Space, supra note 220 (indicating that
Azerbaijan has one registered space object in geosynchronous orbit).
224. In 2012, 3,946 applications were filed in the Eurasian American Patent Office, of which 801
named a United States inventor. EURASIAN PATENT ORGANIZATION 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2012),
available at http://www.eapo.org/pdf/home/report/eapo_2012.pdf. Two hundred ninety-two patents
were granted to United States applicants in 2012. Id. at 22. Azerbaijan is a party to the Eurasian
Patent Convention. Azerbaijan Republic, EURASIAN PATENT ORGANIZATION, http://www.eapo.org/
en/az.html (last visited May 15, 2015).
225. See Boullé, supra note 222 (“This might seem like an extravagance but paper registration in
a state with minimal regulatory oversight of space objects held on its registry could have distinct
benefits for a commercial entity which procured the space object’s launch. . . . Among the 25 states to
register space objects so far this year are North Korea, South Korea, Mexico, India, Brazil, Thailand
and Azerbaijan. For private sector innovators in the space industry it is becoming hopelessly expensive
and unpredictable to obtain meaningful protection for intellectual creations intended for use in outer
space.”).
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stateless ships. 226 The United States has passed legislation stating that stateless
ships can be viewed as “vessels subject to the jurisdiction of the United States”
for purposes of prosecuting drug smugglers. 227 There is a presumption that a
flagless ship is doing something illegal. There is no such presumption for an
unregistered space object, nor should there be, given the large number of
unregistered space objects.
A space object, even one under the control of the United States, is not the
territory of the United States for purposes of 35 U.S.C. § 105 if the object is
“specifically identified and otherwise provided for by an international agreement
to which the United States is a party.” 228 The report accompanying the statute
highlights “[t]he flexibility provided by this exception [because it] is considered
important in negotiating international agreements relating to cooperative
activities in outer space.” 229 The accompanying Senate Report makes it clear
that such international agreements “could include, in addition to
intergovernmental agreements, international agreements between a Federal
agency of the U.S. Government and their foreign counterparts, including foreign
governmental agencies or international organizations.” 230 In other words, if the
European Space Agency (ESA) and the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) reach an agreement to cooperate in space, then it can
be binding in the United States. If Orbital, a United States company, launches a
rocket from Wallops Island, Virginia, carrying a payload for the ESA, a treaty
may operate to remove that payload from United States patent jurisdiction, even
if that payload is physically within the United States. Section 105 further clarifies
the point that any invention-related activities are outside the United States
patent boundaries if occurring on a space object carried on the registry of a
foreign state, even if such space object may otherwise be considered under either
the “jurisdiction” or the “control” of the United States. 231 In other words, if
Orbital’s fictional foreign-flagged rocket carries a payload laboratory in which an
invention is made in outer space, then the invention is not under United States
jurisdiction, even if Orbital is a United States corporation and the rocket was
launched from the United States.
A space object is not within the United States patent boundaries if the space
object is “carried on the registry of a foreign state in accordance with the
Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space” unless the
United States and the foreign country have reached an agreement granting the

226. See Allyson Bennett, Note, That Sinking Feeling: Stateless Ships, Universal Jurisdiction, and
the Drug Trafficking Vessel Interdiction Act, 37 YALE J. INT’L. L. 433, 436 (2012) (discussing how
States can only exercise prescriptive jurisdiction over stateless ships if they satisfy the requirements of
one of five accepted international legal doctrines).
227. Id. at 441 (quoting Marijuana on the High Seas Act, Pub. L. No. 96-350, § 1, 94 Stat. 1159
(1980)).
228. 35 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012).
229. JOSEPH BIDEN, INVENTIONS IN OUTER SPACE, S. REP. NO. 101-266, at 6 (1990).
230. Id. at 7.
231. 35 U.S.C. § 105(a); S. REP. NO. 101-266, at 6.
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United States rights over the object. 232 This exception allows private enterprises
to essentially opt out of United States patent law by choosing where to register
objects for launch into outer space. Orbital could launch from another country,
and wait to register the space object until completing a patent search. 233 After
completing the patent search, Orbital could then choose to register the space
object in the country with the most favorable patent laws. There are less than
two dozen launch sites worldwide that operate on a regular basis, 234 but choosing
to register in China, or French Guinea, or even to build a new launch site in the
Caribbean, 235 may allow rockets—like cruise ships—to carry flags of
convenience, rather than carry the flag associated with corporate headquarters.
Space objects registered in the United States, and subject to no other treaties,
fall within the United States patent boundaries. 236 All other space objects may
fall outside the patent boundaries of the United States, even if launched from
within the United States.
D.

International Space Station

The International Space Station, the largest spacecraft ever built, orbits the
earth at an altitude of 250 miles. 237 Fifteen nations have contributed to the
construction of the International Space Station. It is the subject of the
International Space Station Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA), signed on
January 29 1998, to which the United States is a signatory. 238 The International
Space Station hosts a number of research facilities, and, in 2005, “the NASA
232. 35 U.S.C. § 105(b).
233. See Boullé, supra note 222.
234. Space Launch Report Orbital Space Launch Site Listing, SPACE LAUNCH REPORT (Feb. 10,
2014), http://www.spacelaunchreport.com/padsites.html.
235. It becomes more complicated than even this scenario suggests. As one author points out:
The term “launching state” is given a very broad definition in the UN treaties on outer space
to include a state whose governmental or non-governmental entities launch or procure the
launch of a space object or a state from whose facility (as opposed to territory) a space
object is launched. Though infrequent in practice, there could be as many as four separate
states each regarded as ‘launching states’ for the purposes of a single launch into orbit. When
this happens, those states must jointly determine which one of them will be nominated as the
sole state of registry.
Boullé, supra note 222.
236. Celestial bodies, naturally occurring space objects, are “the common heritage of mankind”
subject to no “national appropriation by any claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or
by any other means.” Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, art. 11(1)–(2), opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3. This treaty provides
valuable insight into the international views on sovereignty of celestial bodies, but the United States is
not a signatory, and so the language is only persuasive and not binding.
237. PlanetSpace, Inc. v. United States, 92 Fed. Cl. 520, 525 (2010).
238. “The station is a venture of international cooperation among NASA, the Russian Federal
Space Agency, Canadian Space Agency, Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency, or JAXA, and 11
members of the European Space Agency, or ESA: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.” International Space
Station: Nations Around the World Mark 10th Anniversary of International Space Station, NASA (Nov.
17, 2008), http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/main/10th_anniversary.html.
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Authorization Act recognized the U.S. orbital segment as the first national
laboratory beyond Earth.” 239 Truly an international vehicle, there are modules
and laboratories that include contributions from the United States, Russia,
Japan, Canada, and the European partnership. 240 The partner states have
national jurisdiction over the International Space Station, and “retain
jurisdiction and control over the elements it registers . . . and over personnel in
or on the Space Station who are . . . nationals” of each partner state. 241
Article 21 of the IGA addresses patent law, stating: “[F]or purposes of
intellectual property law, an activity occurring in or on a Space Station flight
element shall be deemed to have occurred only in the territory of the Partner
State of that element’s registry.” 242 The IGA goes on to discuss issues with
secrecy, invention, enforcement in one European partner state only, even if
infringement occurs in more than one state, and to explicitly state:
The temporary presence in the territory of a Partner State of any
articles, including the components of a flight element, in transit
between any place on Earth and any flight element of the Space
Station registered by another Partner State or ESA shall not in itself
form the basis for any proceedings in the first Partner State for patent
infringement. 243
This means that United States patent law expressly applies to the United
States flight elements on the Space Station. 244 United States law allows for
further treaties governing patent rights on the Space Station, but no further
agreements have been reached. 245 The odd aspect of this is that a piece of
equipment brought on board the Space Station could be used by a Russian
astronaut in a Russian laboratory with no infringement, while the same
equipment used by an American astronaut in an American laboratory, on the
same Space Station, would infringe. 246 Considering that over “one hundred sixtyseven individuals representing 15 countries have visited the complex” this is a
real issue. 247

239. Id.
240. International Space Station: International Cooperation, NASA, http://www.nasa.gov/mission
_pages/station/cooperation/#.Uu_LPXm4mlI (last updated Apr. 30, 2015).
241. Agreement Among the Government of Canada, Governments of Member States of the
European Space Agency, the Government of Japan, the Government of the Russian Federation, and
the Government of the United States of America Concerning Cooperation on the Civil International
Space Station, art. 5, Jan. 29, 1998 T.I.A.S. 12927.
242. Id. art. 21(2).
243. Id. art. 21(6).
244. Id.
245. Patents and Space-Related Inventions, EUR. SPACE AGENCY (Nov. 22, 2012), http://www.es
a.int/About_Us/Industry/Intellectual_Property_Rights/Patents_and_space-related_inventions (noting
that the IGA is the most recent international agreement to address patent rights on the Space Station).
246. G.F., The Economist Explains: How Does Copyright Work in Space?, ECONOMIST (May 22,
2013, 11:50 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/05/economist-explains-12.
247. International Space Station: Nations Around the World Mark 10th Anniversary of
International Space Station, supra note 238. One example of the potential issues arose in 2001, when
multinational intellectual property concerns caused complications. The Space Shuttle Atlantis brought
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The territoriality of the patent rights relies on the module in which the
patent is used on the International Space Station. Patent infringement can occur
in one module, and not another. Infringement of a method patent may,
therefore, be avoided by simply making sure that at least one element of the
claim occurs in a different module from the remaining elements and by a citizen
of another country. The patent boundaries of the International Space Station
represent an interesting exception to the patent boundaries on other space
objects and in outer space. Even when regulated by treaty, patent boundaries
remain territorial in nature, and the natural delineation of outer space patent
boundaries follows the boundaries set for other legal issues.
IV. ON LAND
In order to infringe a patent the invention must be practiced within “the
United States, its territories and possessions.” 248 Congress does not further
delineate the physical aspects of the geographic boundaries of the United States,
its territories and possessions. Uncertainty about the scope and status of these
boundaries illustrates a basic point reiterated throughout this Article. Patent
boundaries are legally significant, yet those boundaries are not delineated. This
geographic ambiguity affects the application of the Patent Code, and the rights
of patent holders. What are the landlocked patent boundaries of the United
States, its territories and possessions?
A.

Territories and Possessions
Neither is it plausible that . . . anyone . . . would commonly refer
to U.S. territories as the United States. In addition to the U.S. Virgin
Islands, U.S. territories include the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam,
Puerto Rico, Midway Islands, and American Samoa. The Northern
Mariana Islands consist of 14 islands situated in the western Pacific just
east of the Philippines and are as far away from the west coast of the
United States as Cairo, Egypt, is from Washington, D.C. Guam is
south of the Northern Mariana Islands and just east of the Philippines.
It is west of the International Dateline and is therefore one day ahead
of the United States. Midway Islands are more than 1,000 miles from
the Hawaiian Islands. American Samoa is located in the South Pacific
roughly in the middle of a triangle drawn between the Hawaiian
Islands, New Zealand and Tahiti. I doubt that anyone would consider

DVDs to the International Space Station. Imposed on DVDs are regional limitations, meaning that
the DVD players in the United States may only play Region 1 DVDs, while DVD players in Russia
may play Region 5 DVDs. To alleviate any concerns about sharing DVDs on the Space Station,
NASA supplied the Space Station with specially modified DVD players that could play DVDs from all
regions. See Peter K. Yu, Region Codes and the Territorial Mess, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 187,
218 (2012); see also Lucy Sherriff, Sony and the DVD Player Phantom Space Launch, REGISTER (Feb.
19, 2001, 3:39 PM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2001/02/19/sony_and_the_dvd_player/.
248. See 35 U.S.C. § 100(c) (2012) (defining the United States); id. § 271(a) (requiring that
infringement occur “within the United States”).
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traveling to these U.S. territories to be travel “inside the United
States.” 249
The definition of the United States itself is a complicated one, defined
differently in dictionaries, statutes, and case law. 250 The main challenge in
defining the United States is determining which territories and possessions fall
within which definition of the United States, which is not a problem with patent
law, inclusive as it is in its reference to all “territories and possessions.” This
inclusive approach to the definition aligns with the broad powers granted
Congress by the Constitution to promote the progress of science and useful
arts. 251
Title 48 of the United States Code defines the territories and possessions of
the United States. These include Puerto Rico, 252 the United States Virgin
Islands, 253 Guam, 254 American Samoa, 255 and the Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands. 256 In the Virgin Islands, the Code expressly finds
United States patent law applicable, while in Guam, copyright law is expressly
made applicable but patent law is not mentioned. 257 However, title 28 of the
United States Code states:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety

249. United States v. Courtney, 240 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1048–49 (W.D. Mo. 2002).
250. See, e.g., Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 671–72 (1945) (“The term ‘United
States’ may be used in any one of several senses.”).
251. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
252. 48 U.S.C. § 734 (2012) (“The statutory laws of the United States . . . shall have the same
force and effect in Puerto Rico as in the United States.”).
253. Id. § 1405q (“The laws of the United States relating to patents, trade marks, and copyrights,
and to the enforcement of rights arising thereunder, shall have the same force and effect in the Virgin
Islands as in the continental United States, and the District Court of the Virgin Islands shall have the
same jurisdiction in causes arising under such laws as is exercised by United States district courts.”).
254. Id. § 1421q (“The laws of the United States which are made applicable to the Northern
Mariana Islands . . . shall be made applicable to Guam on the same terms and conditions as such laws
are applied to the Northern Mariana Islands.”). Interestingly enough, federal copyright laws are
expressly made applicable to Guam. Id. § 1421n (“The laws of the United States relating to copyrights,
and to the enforcement of rights arising thereunder, shall have the same force and effect in Guam as in
the continental United States.”).
255. Id. § 1661(b); see also United States v. Lee, 159 F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1247 (D. Haw. 2001)
(“Lee is presumably not arguing that the term ‘all’ should be read as containing no restrictions.
Otherwise, Lee would have to contend that American Samoa’s courts would, in some instances, have
broader powers than federal district or circuit courts. A district court, for example, cannot try matters
that are reserved for the Court of Federal Claims. If ‘all’ contains no limitation, American Samoa’s
courts could address such matters. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit may not hear appeals from patent
infringement decisions by this court. Such appeals are heard by the Federal Circuit. Reading ‘all’ as
having no limitation would presumably have the High Court of American Samoa hearing patent
appeals that the Ninth Circuit could not hear. There is no reason for this court to conclude that
Congress intended to confer such unlimited jurisdiction on American Samoa’s courts. If ‘all’ powers
are indeed limited, then the limitation of § 3231 must apply.”).
256. 48 U.S.C. § 1822(a) (“The District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands shall have the
jurisdiction of a District Court of the United States . . . .”).
257. See supra notes 253–54.
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protection, copyrights and trademarks. No State court shall have
jurisdiction over any claim for relief arising under any Act of Congress
relating to patents, plant variety protection, or copyrights. For
purposes of this subsection, the term “State” includes any State of the
United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, American Samoa, Guam, and
the Northern Mariana Islands. 258
This language extends the patent boundaries of the United States to each of
these territories and authorizes “the federal district courts to exercise original
jurisdiction in ‘all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States,’ . . . and, more particularly, over ‘any civil action arising under
any Act of Congress relating to patents.’” 259
There is no explanation given for the inclusion of the word “possessions” in
the definition of the United States, nor is the term “possessions” defined. 260 Title
48 of the United States Code refers to “Territories and Insular Possessions” and
appears to refer to possessions as analogous to territories, but separate from
them. However, the insular possessions language arises from a “series of
opinions later known as the Insular Cases” where the Supreme Court “addressed
whether the Constitution, by its own force, applies in any territory that is not a
State.” 261 Such possessions may include guano islands, or former guano islands
like the Kingman Reef, a National Wildlife Refuge located approximately one
thousand miles southwest of Honolulu, Hawaii. 262 Such possessions are not
territories—the “triangular reef has a land area of only 0.01 square
miles. . . . [and] is wet or awash most of the time.” 263 If a
258. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012).
259. Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1064 (2013) (quoting 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1338(a)); see also
Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808 (1988) (comparing § 1331 with § 1338).
260. WesternGeco II, No. 4:09-cv-1827, 2011 WL 3608382, at *9 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2011) (“All
we can gather from the legislative history is that the term ‘possessions’ was an affirmative addition to
the statutory language. As such, it must be given a definition separate and distinct from that of
‘territory.’”).
261. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 756 (2008); see also Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138,
149 (1904) (finding that the Constitution, without legislation, does not require the ceded territory of
the Philippine Islands to enact laws granting citizens the right to trial by jury); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190
U.S. 197, 221 (1903) (holding that, after annexation, Hawaiian laws, “not inconsistent with . . . nor
contrary to the Constitution . . . nor any existing treaty of the United States, shall remain in force”
until Congress indicates otherwise); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287 (1901) (plurality opinion)
(holding that the Foraker Act was constitutional to the extent it imposed duties upon imports from
Puerto Rico since as a territory, Puerto Rico was not a part of the United States within the Revenue
Clause of the Constitution); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243, 244 (1901) (indicating that
based on the holding in Dooley v. United States, tariffs imposed after Puerto Rico became a territory
were recoverable); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222, 236 (1901) (holding that tariffs should not be
imposed on goods imported to Puerto Rico because Puerto Rico was a United States territory and
longer a foreign country); De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 200 (1901) (concluding that Puerto Rico
“was not a foreign country within the meaning of the tariff laws but a territory of the United States”).
262. For a detailed history of the Kingman Reef, see Kingman Reef Atoll Investments, L.L.C. v.
United States, 103 Fed. Cl. 660, 665–85 (2012).
263. Overview: Kingman Reef National Wildlife Refuge, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.,
http://www.fws.gov/refuges/profiles/index.cfm?id=12534 (last visited May 15, 2015).
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citizen of the United States discovers a deposit of guano on any island,
rock, or key, not within the lawful jurisdiction of any other
government, and not occupied by the citizens of any other government,
and takes peaceable possession thereof, and occupies the same, such
island, rock, or key may, at the discretion of the President, be
considered as appertaining to the United States. 264
There is no discussion of the extension of civil jurisdiction to these guano islands.
Offenses committed on these guano islands are “deemed committed on the high
seas, on board a merchant ship or vessel belonging to the United States” for
purposes of criminal jurisdiction. 265 These islands should fall within the United
States patent boundaries, analogous to the inclusion of ships bearing a United
States flag on the high seas within the United States patent boundaries. 266
Per the definitions set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 100(c) and 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a),
the United States patent boundaries extend to all United States possessions,
guano islands that may yet be discovered, and territories, including “the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, American
Samoa, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands.” 267
B.

Arctic Region

The Arctic region is “all of the Earth north of the Arctic Circle.” 268 It
consists of “the frozen seas surrounding the pole and the land mass that is the
perimeter of those seas—a land mass that is interrelated to the sea by continuous
ice in many places.” 269 The Arctic Ocean, central to the Arctic region, is
surrounded by the United States, Canada, Greenland, and Russia and includes
the Svalbard archipelago—the northernmost part of Norway. 270 The Arctic

264. 48 U.S.C. § 1411 (2012).
265. Id.; 48 U.S.C. § 1417.
266. See supra Part II.E for a discussion of patent boundaries on the high seas.
267. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012); see 35 U.S.C. § 100(c) (2012);
268. Frequently Asked Questions About the Arctic, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN.,
http://www.arctic.noaa.gov/faq.html (last visited May 15, 2015) (“In the strictest sense, the Arctic is all
of the Earth north of the Arctic Circle, which is located at 66 degrees, 32 minutes North Latitude.
However, there are other definitions to suit specific scientific or political interests. For instance, the
U.S. Congress has decreed that all of the Bering Sea, which extends southward to about 53 degrees
North Latitude, is part of the Arctic for internal U.S. planning and budgeting purposes. Others make
use of . . . such markers as the southernmost extent of winter sea ice for oceanic boundaries of the
Arctic, or the treeline for terrestrial boundaries.”).
269. Elliot L. Richardson et al., Legal Regimes of the Arctic, 82 AM. SOC’Y. INT’L L. PROC. 315,
315 (1988).
270. Frequently Asked Questions About the Arctic, supra note 268 (“The Arctic region, defined
as the Arctic Ocean and surrounding land, including all of Greenland and Spitsbergen, and the
northern parts of Alaska, Canada, Norway, and Russia, is 14.5 million square kilometers (5.5 million
square miles).”); see also Clive Schofield, Tavis Potts & Ian Townsend-Gault, Boundaries,
Biodiversity, Resources, and Increasing Maritime Activities: Emerging Oceans Governance Challenges
for Canada in the Arctic Ocean, 34 VT. L. REV. 35, 44 n.66 (2009) (describing an arctic boundary claim
by Denmark, on behalf of Greenland, that exceeds the normal size of boundary claims by other
countries).
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region is at the center of numerous boundary disputes. 271 The Arctic region was
largely historically inaccessible, and so many of these disputes were merely
theoretical in nature, with little incentive to settle them. However, the Arctic
region is becoming more accessible, and with its potential for vast mineral
wealth, it is also becoming more desirable. 272 Recognizing the potential issues
arising in the Arctic region, the Ottawa Declaration of 1996 established the
Arctic Council as “a means for promoting cooperation, coordination and
interaction among the Arctic States.” 273 There are eight Arctic States: Canada,
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden, and the
United States of America. 274 Canada, Greenland, Russia, Norway, and the
United States have each claimed part of the Arctic region under the Law of the
Sea as its EEZ, or its equivalent. 275 There is no dispute that each state that
borders the Arctic Ocean has a right to claim an EEZ under the Law of the
Sea. 276 Seaward of the maximum recognized EEZ claims of each of the five
coastal states lies the high seas of the Arctic Ocean. 277
The seabed beneath the Arctic Ocean is separate from the EEZ. Under the
Law of the Sea, each “coastal state can define and establish its rights to the outer
edge of its continental shelf areas beyond the 200 [nautical mile] limit.” 278 Even
though the United States is not a signatory to the Law of the Sea, this aspect is
international custom recognized by the United States government. 279 It is these
claims to the continental shelf that present many of the more complicated issues
governing rights in the Arctic region. 280 On a mission to prove “the Arctic is

271. See IBRU, DURHAM UNIV., MARITIME JURISDICTION AND BOUNDARIES IN THE ARCTIC
REGION 2 (2014), available at https://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/ibru/resources/ibru_arctic_map_27-0215.pdf.
272. See, e.g., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, FACT SHEET NO. 2008-3049,
CIRCUM-ARCTIC RESOURCE APPRAISAL: ESTIMATES OF UNDISCOVERED OIL AND GAS NORTH OF
THE ARCTIC CIRCLE 1 (Peter H. Stauffer ed., 2008) (“90 billion barrels of oil, 1,669 trillion cubic feet
of natural gas, and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids may remain to be found in the Arctic.”).
273. Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council § 1(a), Sept. 19, 1996, 35 I.L.M.
1387 (1996).
274. Id. § 2.
275. Schofield et al., supra note 270, at 44 n.66 (“The exception to this rule is Denmark which,
on behalf of Greenland, claims a 200 nm fishing zone rather than a 200 nm EEZ.”).
276. There are, however, numerous disputes as to where the 200 nautical miles should be
measured from, and there are boundary disputes between the various states concerning EEZ claims.
For instance, there is a dispute between the United States and Canada over whether the Northwest
Passage is international waters or part of Canada’s EEZ. Id. at 41–44; Molly Watson, Comment, An
Arctic Treaty: A Solution to the International Dispute over the Polar Region, 14 OCEAN & COASTAL
L.J. 307, 321 (2009).
277. Schofield et al., supra note 270, at 47.
278. Id. at 48; see also UNCLOS, supra note 19, arts. 55, 57, 76 (defining the EEZ and
continental shelf).
279. Schofield et al., supra note 270, at 44 (observing that the United States regards the Law of
the Sea “as being reflective of customary international law and pursues its oceans policy accordingly”).
280. Id. at 47 (“[T]here are large portions of the seabed underlying this high seas ‘pocket’ . . .
that do not, necessarily form part of the international seabed—that portion of the seabed beyond
national jurisdiction . . . .”).
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Russian,” in 2007 an expedition ventured to the North Pole where Russia
“symbolically staked its claim” to the Arctic Ocean by planting “a one metrehigh titanium Russian flag on the underwater Lomonosov ridge, which Moscow
claims is directly connected to its continental shelf.” 281
Forty-three companies are currently engaged in research and development
“and or sale of products derived from or based on the genetic resources of the
Arctic,” and “[m]ore than half of these companies are based in North America
(i.e. the USA and Canada).” 282 One example, ExxonMobile Upstream Research
Company, received a patent for a “Mooring System for Floating Arctic Vessel”
on October 29, 2013. 283 The patent relates to a “floating marine drilling unit that
employs a riser and mooring system suitable for use in icy arctic waters.” 284
Bioprospecting in the Arctic region has also formed the basis for numerous
patents around the world. 285
The Arctic region deserves no special treatment, despite the fact that a
delineation of boundaries on the Arctic region seabed has yet to be made. Any
regions eventually determined to lie on the United States Outer Continental
Shelf will fall under the patent boundaries of the United States only to the extent
discussed above. 286 The United States EEZ is not within the United States
patent boundaries, and neither is the EEZ of any other country. 287 The high seas
of the Arctic Ocean clearly lie outside the United States patent boundaries. 288

281. Tom Parfitt, Russia Plants Flag on North Pole Seabed, GUARDIAN (Aug. 2, 2007, 1:01 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/aug/02/russia.arctic.
282. DAVID LEARY, UNU-IAS REPORT: BIOPROSPECTING IN THE ARCTIC 21 (2008), available
at http://archive.ias.unu.edu/resource_centre/Bioprospecting%20in%20the%20Arctic.pdf.
283. Mooring Sys. for Floating Arctic Vessel, U.S. Patent No. 8,568,063 (filed Feb. 2, 2010).
284. Id.
285. LEARY, supra note 282, at 22 (“A desk top search of the European and US patent
databases has identified thirty one patents and or patent applications in relation to inventions based
on or derived from the genetic resources of the Arctic.”) (footnotes omitted).
286. The Law of the Sea states:
The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine
areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land
territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles
from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer
edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance.
UNCLOS, supra note 19, art. 76(1). “To make a claim that the continental shelf extends beyond 200
nautical miles, a party must submit information on the end of the continental shelf to the Commission
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf.” Cinnamon P. Carlarne, Arctic Dreams and Geoengineering
Wishes: The Collateral Damage of Climate Change, 49 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 602, 619 (2011). The
United States is mapping its continental shelf, but, even so, the exact boundaries remain unclear. Since
the United States is not a party to the Law of the Sea, no claim need be submitted to the Commission
on behalf of the United States.
287. See supra Part II.C for a discussion of the patent boundaries of the EEZ.
288. See supra Part II.E for a discussion of the patent boundaries of the high seas.
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Antarctic Region

The Antarctic region, a cold and remote continent that abuts no other state
and has no native human population, was nonetheless the subject of tremendous
territorial dispute. 289 Seven countries claimed rights over the region, and the
issue of territorial sovereignty was set aside by adoption of the Antarctic Treaty
in 1961. 290 The treaty resolved to protect “the interest of all mankind that
Antarctica shall continue forever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes
and shall not become the scene or object of international discord.” 291 One of the
fundamental tenants of the Antarctica Treaty was to promote and protect
“international cooperation in scientific investigation in Antarctica.” 292 The treaty
applies to “to the area south of 60° South Latitude, including all ice shelves, but
[not] . . . the high seas within that area.” 293 As in the Arctic region, the
boundaries within the Antarctic remain unclear. However, in the Antarctic, the
treaty suspends all claims to territorial sovereignty as long as the treaty is in
force. 294
The exploitation of resources is very different in the Arctic region and the
Antarctic region.
In the Arctic, extraction of oil, gas and minerals, at sea and on land, is
an important reality; in the Antarctic, it is only a conjecture. The living
resources of the Antarctic Ocean are abundant, and significant
international exploitation occurs. In the Arctic, large-scale fishing is
important only in North Atlantic areas and the Barents Sea, although
whaling is still a source of food for indigenous peoples and an
expression of their traditional culture. While the Arctic has plentiful
caribou, reindeer, polar bears and other land-based mammals, the
Antarctic has none, and only shoreline colonies of penguins and seals
require protection. Even when the problems are directly comparable—
such as the risks posed by marine pollution and the need to control
navigation in ice-filled waters—the radically different legal status of
both regions may necessitate different solutions. 295
The Arctic and Antarctic regions are very different, but in each region the
climate and the resources available have led to innovation, which ought to be
protectable by patent law. 296
289. Morten Walløe Tvedt, Patent Law and Bioprospecting in Antarctica, 47 POLAR REC. 46, 46
(2010).
290. The Antarctic Treaty had twelve original signatories: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile,
France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Russian Federation (then the Soviet Union), South Africa,
the United Kingdom, and the United States. Antarctic Treaties: Parties, SECRETARIAT OF THE
ANTARCTIC TREATY, http://ats.aq/devAS/ats_parties.aspx?lang=e (last visited May 15, 2015). As of
February 15, 2015, fifty-one nations have ratified the treaty. Id.
291. Antarctic Treaty preamble, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
292. Id.
293. Id. art. VI.
294. Id. art. IV(2).
295. Richardson et al., supra note 269, at 324.
296. See Tvedt, supra note 289, at 46 (“The number of patents that include biological material of
Antarctic origin is growing rapidly.”).
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The Antarctic Treaty does not address patent law specifically. It states that
authorized personnel in the Antarctic “shall be subject only to the jurisdiction of
the Contracting Party of which they are nationals.” 297 Therefore, United States
patent boundaries extend to United States nationals in Antarctic, but not to
nationals of other countries. Like in outer space, two scientists of different
nationalities can work together at the same lab bench, sharing data and research,
and one can be found to infringe a United States patent while the other, doing
exactly the same thing, is not infringing. 298 Again, as in outer space, the patent
boundaries of the Antarctic region are personnel-based and not territorialbased. 299
D.

Embassies

Imagine a scenario where an American employee at the American embassy
in Azerbaijan purchases an electric razor from a local store. The employee uses
the razor at home in Baku, Azerbaijan. 300 One morning, running late, the
employee brings the razor to work and hastily shaves at the office. If that razor
contains technology that could infringe a United States patent, the employee, by
shaving at the office, has opened himself up to a suit for patent infringement.
In the early twentieth century, the United States purchased and used radio
receivers from Marconi Wireless Telephone Company of America. The receivers
were covered by a number of patents, and during the term of the patent, the
United States manufactured and built its own radio receivers. 301 Ten such
receivers were assembled and used at the “United States Naval Radio Station at
the American Legation in Peking. The station was located within the legation
grounds.” 302 Marconi sued the United States for infringement, raising the novel
question: “Does manufacture and use in such a location violate the monopoly

297. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 291, art. VIII.
298. The treaty also states “scientific observations and results from Antarctica shall be
exchanged and made freely available.” Id. art. III. As others have pointed out—can the Patent Act’s
grant of a right to exclude others from practicing an invention coexist with the requirement that results
be made freely available? See Tvedt, supra note 289, at 52–53 (“The underlying difficult question is
whether there is conflict between establishing an exclusive right covering, for example, using and
making the Antarctic based invention and the accessibility of scientific observations and results. This is
a question concerning the availability of research results and use by others of the
modified/isolated/found biological material and derived products.”).
299. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 212–13 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“As
was well settled at English common law before our Republic was founded, a nation’s personal
sovereignty over its own citizens may support the exercise of civil jurisdiction in transitory actions
arising in places not subject to any sovereign.”).
300. See supra notes 223–25 and accompanying text for a discussion of the dearth of Azerbaijani
patents issued to American inventors.
301. The patent infringement suit specifically addresses the time period from “March 8, 1913,
when plaintiff first gave notice of infringement to the defendant, to August 16, 1915, when the patent
expired.” Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. of Am. v. United States, 99 Ct. Cl. 1, 5 (1942), vacated in part on
other grounds, aff’d in part, 320 U.S. 1 (1943).
302. Id. at 38.
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created by the patent and which extends ‘throughout the United States, and the
Territories thereof,’ as expressed by Section 4884 of the Revised Statutes?” 303
Evaluating Brown v. Duchesne, 304 and Gardiner v. Howe, 305 the court held
that if foreign ships are outside of United States patent boundaries, even in
American waters, and if American ships are inside United States patent
boundaries, even on the high seas, then the United States patent boundaries
must extend to the American Legation at Peking. 306 Infringement was thus
found under United States patent law, despite the use being in the American
Legation at Peking.
Marconi was decided in 1942, when section 4884 of the Revised Statutes
simply said that the patent grant extended “throughout the United States, and
the Territories thereof” with no further definition. 307 In 1952, the Patent Act was
amended to include the following definition of the United States: “the United
States of America, its territories and possessions.” 308 This amendment was made
both to broaden and delineate more clearly the patent boundaries of the United
States. 309
In 1942, the Court of Claims found that the United States patent boundaries
extended to legations providing precedent for a determination that, today, the
United States patent boundaries should include all United States legations,
consulates, and embassies, while excluding all foreign legations, consulates, and
embassies, even those on United States soil. 310 The American embassy worker,
303. Id. at 67. Section 4884 of the Revised Statutes read: “Every patent shall contain a short title
or description of the invention or discovery, correctly indicating its nature and design, and a grant to
the patentee, his heirs or assigns, for the term of seventeen years, of the exclusive right to make, use,
and vend the invention or discovery . . . throughout the United States, and the Territories thereof,
referring to the specification for the particulars thereof. A copy of the specification and drawings shall
be annexed to the patent, and be a part thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 4884 (repealed 1952).
304. 60 U.S. 183 (1856). See supra notes 139–46 for a brief overview of Brown v. Duchesne.
305. 9 F. Cas. 1157 (C.C.D. Mass. 1865). See supra notes 153–56 for a brief overview of Gardiner
v. Howe.
306. Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. of Am., 99 Ct. Cl. at 67–68.
307. 35 U.S.C. § 4884 (repealed 1952).
308. Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, ch. 950, § 100, 66 Stat. 797 (codified at 35 U.S.C.
§ 100(c) (2012)).
309. Federico, supra note 11, at 201.
310. An interesting parallel that has yet to be decided by the courts is the question of whether
United States patent law extends to overseas military bases. The United States exercises at least
partial sovereignty over military bases, so there is some basis for extraterritoriality, however, the
extent of the sovereignty varies from base to base and country to country depending on the Status of
Forces Agreement in place between the host country and the United States. These bilateral treaties,
which are in place virtually everywhere the United States has an overseas military base, differ from
country to country. There has been no case law or legislation extending the United States patent
boundaries to overseas military bases, and no suggestion of patent sovereignty. From a policy
perspective, foreign governments are unlikely to impose patent liability on overseas military
installations, and United States patent law, therefore, provides a remedy for the patentee, that the
patentee may otherwise be unable to collect. However, the uniqueness of the Status of Forces
Agreement treaties means that each base must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis to determine
whether that base is a possession of the United States or not and, therefore, whether each base is
under United States patent sovereignty.
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therefore, must comply with United States patent law while at the embassy, even
when living in Azerbaijan.
V.

CONCLUSION

Patent infringement must take place “within the United States, its
territories and possessions.” 311 This carries with it a presumption against
extraterritoriality, bolstered by the “longstanding principle of American law
‘that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply
only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.’” 312
The territorial nature of patent law has long been known. In defining the
United States, Congress could have expressly delineated its jurisdiction, as they
have in other statues, such as 18 U.S.C. § 7, which expressly sets forth a detailed
definition of “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”
Congress has not done so, and therefore the presumption must hold that
Congress did not intend to create an overly expansive definition of the United
States.
That being said, 35 U.S.C. § 100(c) fails in its cursory definition of the
United States, its territories and possessions, raising more questions than it
answers. Technology has spread to every corner of the earth, bringing once
hostile territory under the spell of deepwater oil drilling, satellite communication
systems, and mobile phone technology. These technologies present challenges to
our current understanding of patent law. The patent boundaries of the United
States extend from the International Space Station to the Outer Continental
Shelf.
It is time for Congress to take action and codify the United States patent
boundaries. Defining the limits of United States patent sovereignty is a necessary
course of action. As litigation at the limits of technology and geography
increases, judicial efficiency will be maximized by a clear codification of the
patent boundaries of the United States.

311. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012) (stating that patent infringement must take place “within the
United States”); id. § 100(c) (defining “United States” as the “United States of America, its territories
and possessions”).
312. Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 (1993) (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Oil Co., 499
U.S. 244, 248 (1991)).

